A Practitioner\u27s Guide to Oklahoma Trade Secrets Law, Past, Present, and Future: The Uniform Trade Secrets Act by Cipolla, Richard J., Jr.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 27 Issue 2 
Winter 1991 
A Practitioner's Guide to Oklahoma Trade Secrets Law, Past, 
Present, and Future: The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
Richard J. Cipolla Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard J. Cipolla Jr., A Practitioner's Guide to Oklahoma Trade Secrets Law, Past, Present, and Future: 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 27 Tulsa L. J. 137 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 27 Winter 1991 Number 2
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO OKLAHOMA
TRADE SECRETS LAW, PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE: THE UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT*
Richard J. Cipolla, Jr.t
"The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the en-
couragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade
secret law. 'The necessity of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the
very life and spirit of the commercial world.' ,i
I. INTRODUCTION
The Oklahoma legislature has recently adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA). z The UTSA now constitutes the law governing
* Copyright © 1991 by Richard J. Cipolla, Jr.
t B.S.(Honors Program), University of Tulsa, 1985; J.D. University of Kansas, 1989. Associ-
ate, Holliman, Langholz, Runnels & Dorwart, a Professional Corporation, Tulsa, Oklahoma. This
article is dedicated to Kim L. Cipolla, Kelsey Marie Cipolla, who, in strict compliance with Mur-
phy's Law, was born on July 27, 1991, hours after this article's prototype was irretrievably lost in the
bowels of word processing limbo as the result of a computer crash, and Indy.
1. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,481-82 (1974) (quoting National Tube Co.
v. Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 459, 462 (1902), aff'd, 70 N.E. 1127 (Ohio 1903)).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (Supp. 1990) (Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act). The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was approved for enactment in all the states in 1979 and clarifying
amendments to sections 2(b), 3(a), 7, and 11 were approved in 1985. UNiF. TRADE SECRETs ACT,
14 U.L.A. 433, 434-36 Prefatory Note (1990). See generally Steve Borgman, The Adoption of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act: How Uniform Is Uniform?, 27 IDEA 73 (1986); Ramon A. Klitzke, The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. Rlv. 277 (1980) [hereinafter Klitzke, Uniform Act]; James
C. Lydon, The Deterrent Effect of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
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trade secret misappropriation in Oklahoma,3 and expressly "displaces"
prior conflicting common law on the subject.4 Although the UTSA be-
came effective in 1986, it has not been the subject of judicial interpreta-
tion in Oklahoma.
Soc'y 427 (1987); Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The
States' Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49 (1990). Thirty-six jurisdictions have adopted the
UTSA. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr, 14 U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1991).
3. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act provides in pertinent part that:
A. Except as provided for in subsection B of this section, the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this state providing civil
remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.
B. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act does not affect:
1. contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade se-
cret; or
2. other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 92.
Washington is one of the first jurisdictions to have squarely addressed the issue of the effect of
the UTSA on common law. The Washington Supreme Court expressly held that the UTSA had no
effect on traditional common law causes of action that are not dependent upon the existence of trade
secrets, such as breach of contract or breach of confidentiality; these claims may be brought indepen-
dently of trade secret claims governed by the UTSA. See, Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d
665, 673-74 (Wash. 1987); Herbster v. Global Intermediary, Inc., No. 89-2198-V, 1991 WL 205659,
at *1 (holding that plaintiff's fraud and breach of contractually implied duty of good faith is not
precluded by UTSA); accord Legal Serv. Plans, Inc. v. Heneghan, Pikor, Kennedy & Allen, No. CV-
90 299448, 1990 WL 283681, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1990) (holding in cursory fashion that
plaintiff's breach of implied contract and tortious interference with contractual relations claims do
not conflict with UTSA provisions); see also MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Generic Business Solutions,
Inc., No. CIV.A.9908, 1990 WL 3665 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 1990) (mem.) (holding that the UTSA does
not supersede equitable remedies). Compare Ace Novelty Co. v. Vijuk Equip., Inc., No. 90 C 3116,
1990 WL 129510, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1990) (mem.) (finding that the common law conversion
of invention and research and development claims is preempted by Illinois' Trade Secrets Act).
Other UTSA jurisdictions have impliedly held in accordance with Washington's resolution of
the issue. See Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act is not a 'catch-all for industrial torts.' ") (quoting Electro-Craft Corp. v. Con-
trolled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897 (Minn. 1983)); Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Koering,
404 N.W.2d 301, 306-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (adjudicating common law claims for breach of duty
of loyalty and unfair competition as independent of and not governed by the UTSA); see also Micro
Display Sys. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D. Minn. 1988) (interpreting Minnesota's Trade
Secrets Act as preempting only conflicting law pertaining solely to trade secrets and holding that to
the extent a cause of action in the commercial area is not dependent on trade secrets, such as a
breach of a duty of loyalty and unfair competition, it will continue to exist). But see Trade Secrets:
Common Law Claims Are Preempted By Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 29 (discussing ITT Shadow, Inc. v. Stein, No.86-5367 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 1987)).
4. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 92(A). For decisions from other jurisdictions holding that
the UTSA controls where there is a conflict between the statute and prior case law, see American
Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee,
591 A.2d 578, 585 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), and Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898. For decisions
holding that state trade secrets law is not preempted by federal patent and copyright law see
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 470 (patent law) and Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr.
787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (copyright law). See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.
489 U.S. 141 (1989); Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1455 (1Ith Cir. 1991).
See generally Gary M. Ropski & Michael J. Kline, A Primer On Intellectual Property Rights: The
Basics of Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Trade Secrets & Related Rights, 50 ALa. L. REV. 405
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Sister states lacking prior judicial interpretation of the UTSA have
not hesitated to incorporate pre-existing common law into their judicial
analyses of the UTSA. s Indeed, the UTSA's comments state that the
UTSA "codifies the basic principles of common law trade secret protec-
tion" and "the results of the better reasoned cases concerning the reme-
dies for trade secret misappropriation." 6
Thus, the trade secret common law of Oklahoma,7 and the common
law of other influential states, may serve as the foundation of future judi-
cial interpretation of Oklahoma's version of the UTSA (Oklahoma's
Trade Secrets Act). At the very least, a rudimentary understanding of
such law must serve as a prerequisite to any analysis concerning the cur-
rent or future status of trade secret law in Oklahoma.
In stark contrast to the myriad of cases which comprise the common
law of trade secrets, there have been relatively few reported decisions
rendered under the UTSA.8 Accordingly, this article will survey pre-
UTSA Oklahoma, and pertinent non-Oklahoma common law, aug-
mented with relevant references to post-UTSA law where necessary and
available.
II. THE TRADE SECRET CAUSE OF ACTION
Absent an agreement to the contrary, an employee may leave his
employment in order to compete with his former employer as long as the
employee departs without misappropriating his former employer's prop-
erty, i.e., trade secrets.9 If an employer believes that former employees
(1986). Thus, under Kewanee and its progeny, an Oklahoma trade secrets plaintiff's claims must be
determined entirely under Oklahoma trade secrets law.
5. See, e.g., Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 688 (D. Minn. 1986),
aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987); Network Telecommunications, Inc. v. Boor-Crepeau, 790 P.2d
901, 903 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Engineered Mechanical Serv., Inc. v. Langlois, 464 So. 2d 329, 333
(La. Ct. App. 1984); Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898.
6. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 434-35 (1990).
7. For a functional synopsis of Oklahoma trade secrets common law, see generally E. Harry
Gilbert, III, Note, Trade Regulations: Trade Secret Law in Oklahoma, 32 OLA. L. REV. 691
(1979). For a survey of subsequent Oklahoma trade secrets common law, see ABC Coating Co. v. J.
Harris & Sons, Ltd., 747 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1986), and Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733
(Okla. 1980). See also Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1982).
8. See Gillis Assoc. Indus. v. Cari-AlI, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 881, 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
9. Safeway Stores v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d 661, 665 (10th Cir. 1955); Optic Graphics v. Agee, 591
A.2d 578, 584 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (post-UTSA); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 393, 395, 396 (1958). See generally Marcia A. Crone, The Departing Employee-Pre-
vention of Competition and Protection of Trade Secrets, 50 TEx. B.J. 372 (1987); Employee Disloyalty:
Pre-Departure Preparations & Solicitation of the Employer's Customers & Employees, 3 Bus. TORTS
REPORTER 234 (1991); S. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Liability for Inducing Employee Not Engaged for
Definite Term to Move to Competitor, 24 A.L.R.3D 821 (1969).
1991]
3
Cipolla: A Practitioner's Guide to Oklahoma Trade Secrets Law, Past, Prese
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:137
have misappropriated trade secrets, the employer may bring suit against
the former employees seeking injunctive or compensatory relief.'0
In order to prevail upon a common law cause of action alleging mis-
appropriation of trade secrets, a "plaintiff must establish that: (1) a trade
secret existed; (2) [the] defendants acquired the trade secret through a
confidential relationship; and, (3) [the] defendants used the trade secret
without authorization from [the] plaintiff."'I The burden of proving the
existence of a trade secret is on the plaintiff.' 2 The existence of a trade
secret represents a question of fact for the jury to resolve.' 3
A. Element Number One: Existence of a Trade Secret
First, the plaintiff must show that the alleged trade secret is within
the class of data usually regarded as trade secrets. The information must
derive economic value from not being publicly known or readily discov-
erable. Then, the plaintiff must show that reasonable measures were
10. See sources cited supra note 9. See generally Michael R. Griflinger, Strategies for Ex-em-
ployer Plaintiffs in Trade Secret Actions, 34 PRAc. LAW. 69 (March 1988).
11. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, 584 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir.
1978); accord Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn. 1982) (explain-
ing that the three elements "should not be artificially separated for purposes of analysis since, in a
significant sense, they are interdependent.") (quoting 1 ROOER M. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
§ 7.07(1), at 95 (1980)).
The UTSA has condensed the three common law elements into two elements by de-emphasizing
the importance of trade secret use. See UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433, 434 Prefatory
Note (1990); Clinipad Corp. v. Aplicare, Inc., No. 235252, 1991 WL 27899, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 10, 1991) (elements of action under UTSA are: (1) trade secret existence; and (2) trade secret
misappropriation); see also infra note 79.
12. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 743 (Okla. 1980); accord Acuson Corp. v.
Aloka Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 368, 373 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (post-UTSA); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin
Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 674 (Wash. 1987) (post-UTSA). One UTSA jurisdiction has extrapolated a
geographic restriction upon a trade secret plaintiff's general burden of proof. See Dionne v. South-
east Foam Converting & Packaging, 397 S.E.2d 110, 113 n.2 (Va. 1990) which held, without a single
precedential citation, that while a trade secret plaintiff bears the burden of proof under Virginia's
Trade Secrets Act, "the evidence required is that pertaining to the trade area in which the proponent
competes; unlike the standard applicable to an applicant for a patent, the trade-secret proponent is
not required to prove its claim nationwide." In this regard, the Dionne court's unsupported holding
is at least questionable, if not wholly aberrational.
13. See Black, 584 F.2d at 952; ABC Coating Co. v. J. Harris & Sons, Ltd., 747 P.2d 266 (Okla.
1986). No trend has emerged in other states regarding whether existence of a trade secret is a
question of law or fact under the UTSA. Most states appear to have followed state common law on
the issue. For cases holding the issue is one of fact, see Gronholz v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 869 F.2d
390, 393 (8th Cir. 1989); Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991);
Andrew Corp. v. Van Doren Indus., No. CIV.A.88-2414-0, 1990 WL 136779, at *4 (D. Kan. July 5,
1990); Colorado Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Engineered
Mechanical Serv. v. Langlois 464 So. 2d 329, 333 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Rehabilitation Specialists v.
Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). But seeAcuson, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 373, which
held that the issue is one of law.
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taken to keep the information secret. The alleged trade secret must fit
the legal definition of trade secret.
1. Definition of a "Trade Secret"
The term "trade secret" is a term of art, yet it is often inartfully used
by courts and practitioners, as well as laymen. Trade secret law is factu-
ally determinative,14 and as such, is inconsistent. This incongruity un-
doubtedly stems from the fact that "an exact definition of a trade secret is
not possible.""5
a. The UTSA
Nevertheless, the UTSA has attempted to articulate a contemporary
definition of the term "trade secret." Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act
states that:
'Trade secret' means information including a formula, pattern, compi-
lation, program, device, method, technique or process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
14. See, eg., National Presto Indus. v. Hamilton Beach, Inc., No. 88 C 10567, 1990 WL
208594, at *8 (N.D. Il. Dec. 12, 1990) (post-UTSA).
15. Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. 1975); see also Alois V. Gross,
Annotation, 9hat Is "Trade Secret" So As To Render Actionable Under State Law Its Use or Disclo-
sure By Former Employee, 59 A.L.R.4TH 641 (1988). But see Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591
A.2d 578, 585 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (citing 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 14.06, at 35 (4th ed. 1982 & Supp. 1991) (There are
really only two generic "types of trade secrets: technological developments and internal operating
information.") (post-UTSA).
The United States Supreme Court has held that trade secrets are property, and that where state
action is implicated, such property is "protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). Yet, in E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917), Justice Holmes initially observed that "Et]he word
'property' as applied to ... trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary conse-
quences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith."
Justice Holmes then admonished that in trade secret cases, the "property may be denied, but the
confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point [in such cases] is not property ... but that the
defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs .... T]he first thing to be made sure of
is that the defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the trust reposed in him." Id. at 102.
Under Oklahoma common law, protection of a trade secret rests upon both "the theory of
property right in the trade secret and the theory of a confidential relationship between the parties
who have knowledge of the trade secret." Gilbert, supra note 7, at 691. Neither component of this
dichotomy should be over-emphasized by trade secret courts.
Unfortunately, in apparent ignorance of Justice Holmes' declaration in Du Pont, the reported
cases often over-emphasize the existence of a trade secret while the objectionable conduct of the
alleged trade secret misappropriator takes a secondary role. Ramon A. Klitzke, Trade Secrets: Im-
portant Quasi-Property Rights, 41 Bus. LAW. 555, 570 (1986) [hereinafter Klitzke, Trade Secrets].
Accordingly, in order to prevail upon a claim of misappropriation of trade secrets, the plaintiff must
first prove that it was the owner of trade secrets. However, a plaintiff, in its efforts to prove owner-
ship of trade secrets, must stress the defendant's egregious efforts to improperly acquire trade secrets.
1991]
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proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.
16
b. The Restatement
Prior to the promulgation of the UTSA, the overwhelming majority
of states utilized the definition of trade secret propounded in Restatement
of Torts section 757.17 Before the UTSA was adopted in Oklahoma, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on the Restatement
and the Restatement's common law progeny as the source of Oklahoma's
trade secret law.18
In Amoco Production Company v. Lindley,1 9 the term trade secret
was defined as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of informa-
tion which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage 0 over competitors who do not know or use it."2
The Amoco court also quoted with approval the following criteria to
be used in the determination of trade secret status:
(1) [T]he extent to which the information is known outside of [the
employer's] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and others involved in [the employer's] business; (3) the extent of
measures taken by [the employer] to guard the secrecy of the informa-
tion; (4) the value of the information to [the employer] and to [the
employer's] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended
by [the employer] developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty
with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated
by others.22
16. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(4).
17. RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). Interestingly, the nation's most widely accepted trade secret law, Restate-
ment of Torts § 757 (1939), was omitted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). The omis-
sion was undoubtedly a necessary and motivating factor in the 1979 promulgation of the UTSA. See
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 433, 434 Prefatory Note (1990).
18. See, eg., Central Plastics, 537 P.2d at 333; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 743
(Okla. 1980); See generally Gilbert, supra note 7.
19. 609 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1980).
20. The competitive advantage contemplated by the Restatement was discussed in Surgidev
Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 692 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir.
1987), where the court stated that "[i]f the idea of another saves a person who has wrongful knowl-
edge of it time and money, such person has been materially benefitted and the information has
economic value." Even a slight competitive advantage may fulfill this requirement of trade secret
protection. Sheridan v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Five years earlier, in Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson,23 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court quoted with approbation another passage em-
phasizing the critical role of secrecy in any trade secret analysis, stating
that:
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of public
knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret.
Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one mar-
kets cannot be a secret. Substantially, a trade secret is known only in
the particular business in which it is used. It is not requisite that only
the proprietor of the business know it. He may without losing his pro-
tection communicate it to employees involved in its use. He may like-
wise communicate it to others pledged to secrecy. Others may also
know of it independently, as, for example, when they have discovered
the process or formula by independent invention and are keeping it a
secret. Nevertheless, a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so
that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in
acquiring the information.24
The statutory definition of trade secret, for the most part, embodies
its Restatement predecessor.25 Thus, although no longer controlling,
cases decided under the Restatement provide guidance in deciding
whether a trade secret exists under the new definition contained in the
UTSA.2 6 There are only two material differences between the definition
of trade secret included in the Restatement and that which is contained
in the UTSA. The Restatement required that a trade secret be continu-
ously used in one's business,27 whereas the UTSA does not.2" Further-
more, the Restatement necessitates a "substantial element of secrecy,"2 9
whereas the UTSA requires secrecy "reasonable under the circum-
stances,"3 ° as a prerequisite to trade secret status.
Determination of trade secret status is necessarily dependent upon
23. 537 P.2d 330 (Okla. 1975).
24. Id. at 333 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)).
25. See, eg., Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 688 (D. Minn. 1986),
aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987); Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 585 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991).
26. See Network Telecommunications, Inc. v. Boor-Crepeau, 790 P.2d 901, 903 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1990); New England Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Miller, No. CV-89-0285030-S, 1991 WL 65766, at *6
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 1991); Optic Graphics, 591 A.2d at 585; Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander,
434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Wis. 1989).
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
28. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 439 (1990) (UTSA "extends protec-
tion to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to
use.").
29. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (emphasis added); see also Patrick P. Phil-
lips, The Concept of Reasonableness in the Protection of Trade Secrets, 42 Bus. LAW. 1045 (1987).
30. Oklahoma's Trade Secret Act § 86(4)(b) (emphasis added); see also David W. Slaby et al.,
1991]
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the facts of each case.31 The court looks at the equities of the "circum-
stances out of which the claimed trade secret arises."' 32 The court then
balances the right of the company to use its employees and resources to
its utmost advantage against the right of the intelligent and skillful em-
ployee to exercise his creativity on-the-job.33 The courts consider ques-
tions such as: (1) how many of the innovative elements in the process
were available in the prior art, and (2) how dependent is the development
of the product on the intrinsic knowledge of the innovator?34 Ultimately,
courts must answer the question: Did the company treat the innovation
with the requisite secrecy to place others on notice of its claim?35  Other
factors considered are the time, money and company facilities used in the
item's production, and the employer's own knowledge about the subject
matter of the claim.3 6
2. Secrecy
An analysis of the issue of secrecy serves to demonstrate just how
difficult a plaintiff's burden of proof may be in establishing the existence
of a trade secret. If the plaintiff has not treated a process or design as if it
were a trade secret, the court will act accordingly and deny the plaintiff's
request for trade secret status and protection. 7 The foregoing truism
begs the crucial question: "How secret is secret?' 38
Although somewhat different semantically, the plaintiff's burden of
Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the Concept "Efforts Reasonable Under the Circumstances to
Maintain Secrecy," 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321 (1989).
31. Knudsen Corp. v. Ever-Fresh Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 241, 244 (C.D. Cal. 1971).





37. See Gasway Corp. v. Consolidated Eng'g Co., No. 89 C 874, 1990 WL 205462, at *4 (N.D.
IMI. Nov. 29, 1990) ("Without secrets there can be no violation of the [Uniform] Trade Secrets
Act.").
38. "Because of the intangible nature of a trade secret, the extent of the property right therein is
defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to
others." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984). However, in the context of trade
secret litigation, "'[s]ecrecy is a relative term.'" Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape
Corp., 192 N.Y.S.2d 102, 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962)
(quoting L.M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431, 437 (1948)). "The degree of secrecy
that is required for a trade secret need not be absolute or 100% perfect." General Aniline & Film
Corp. v. Frantz & Frantz Indus., 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See USM Corp. v. Marson
Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 902 (Mass. 1979) ("We do not require the possessor of a trade
secret to take heroic measures to preserve its secrecy."); see also Slaby et al., supra note 30 (pre- and
post-UTSA); Phillips, supra note 29 (pre- and post-UTSA).
[Vol. 27:137
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proving secrecy is materially similar under either the Restatement's com-
mon law, or the UTSA's statutory, prerequisites. The Restatement re-
quired "a "substantial element of secrecy," such that "except by the use
of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the informa-
tion."39 The UTSA, however, requires "[o]nly reasonable efforts, not all
conceivable efforts" under the circumstances, to protect the confidential-
ity of putative trade secrets."
Specifically, the plaintiff must show that the purported trade secrets
were not "of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade."'"
While the plaintiff's claimed trade secrets need not be patentable,42 they
must contain unique elements not generally known or used in the trade.43
However, "[a] trade secret can exist in the unique combination of other-
wise known components; although each of its parts, by itself, may be in
the public domain, the unified process, design and operation of the com-
bination may be the essence of the secret."'  Indeed, a trade secret can
39. Amoco, 609 P.2d at 743 (emphasis added by the court) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 cmt. b, at 6 (1939)).
40. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987). For an eco-
nomic analysis, written by Judge Posner, of the UTSA's concept of "efforts reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain secrecy," see Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 179-80
(7th Cir. 1991) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment based upon existence of factual
issues concerning secrecy, and observing that "[i]f trade secrets are protected only if their owners
take extravagant, productivity-impairing measures to maintain their secrecy, the incentive to invest
resources in discovering more efficient methods of production will be reduced, and with it the
amount of invention."); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 439 (1990)
("The Courts do not require that extreme and unduly expensive procedures be taken to protect trade
secrets against flagrant industrial espionage."); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332
N.W.2d 890, 901-02 (Minn. 1983) (finding that mere intent to keep information secret is not enough;
an employer must show reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy by its use of some combination of
physical security and confidentiality procedures designed to indicate to employees the secret charac-
ter of the information) (post UTSA); Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Management Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366,
369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("It is diflicult, if not impossible, to prevent an employee from discover-
ing his employer's trade secrets."); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 675 (Wash. 1987)
("A trade secrets plaintiff need not prove that every element of an information compilation is un-
available elsewhere.") (post-UTSA).
41. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); see Central Plastics Co. v.
Goodson, 537 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. 1975).
42. See Imi-Tech Corp. v. Gaglani, 691 F. Supp. 214, 231 (S.D. Cal. 1986). See generally Lisa
M. Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and Patent Law Harmoni-
zation: An Analysis and Proposal, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 523 (1990); Ropski &
Kline, supra note 4; Harold See, A General Practitioner's Introduction to Patent and Trade Secret
Law: A Primer On Intellectual Property, 46 ALA. LAW. 188 (1985).
43. Central Plastics, 537 P.2d at 333-34; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
44. Lowndes Prod. v. Brower, 191 S.E.2d 761, 764 (S.C. 1972) (quoting 2 RUDOLF
CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 52.1 (3d ed.
1968)); see Integrated Cash Management Serv. v. Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 174 (2d
Cir. 1990) (finding that several non-secret generic utility computer software programs combined to
create a unique computer software product constituted a trade secret); Salsbury Lab. v. Merieux
Lab., 735 F. Supp. 1555, 1569 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (explaining that although some components may be
1991]
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be merely a minor technological advancement over common industry
practice.45
Furthermore, as the Court in Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology,
Inc.46 proclaimed:
Manufacturing methods and techniques-the technical 'know-how'
gleaned from experience and repeated practical application-is [often]
a proper subject of trade secret protection. Processes relating to manu-
facture or treatment of metals, chemicals, or raw materials have fre-
quently been found to be subject to trade secret protection.4 7
Nevertheless, the often-repeated notion that "[a]lmost anything may
be in the nature of a trade secret,"'4 is untrue and ill-conceived. The
reported decisions are replete with examples of plaintiffs who have failed
to meet their burden of proving the existence of a trade secret in the face
of evidence that the alleged trade secret was in fact commonly known in
the industry.49
Trade secret status and protection can be forfeited in any number of
ways. It cannot be over-emphasized that public disclosure of informa-
tion can preclude trade secret protection.50 Knowledge placed in the
in public domain, multi-step vaccine manufacturing process as a whole constitutes trade secret),
aff'd as modified, 908 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1990).
45. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
46. 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 687 n.8 (citation omitted) (citing State ex reL Armour & Co. v. Gulf Sulphur Corp.,
231 A.2d 470 (Del. Super. CL 1967) (process for manufacture of potassium sulfate)). See also Impe-
rial Chem. Indus. v. National Distillers and Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), modified, 354 F.2d
459 (1965) (high pressure process for manufacture of polyethylene); Amberley Co. v. Brown Co.,
156 U.S.P.Q. 633 (S.D. Ohio 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1969) (process for recovering
cellulose fibers from thermoplastic coated broke); Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting, 397 S.E.2d
110, 113 (Va. 1990) (process for manufacturing "Durofoam" plastic packaging) (post-UTSA).
48. Lowndes, 191 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 52 (3d ed. 1968)).
49. See, eg., Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. 1975) (negating trade
secret status for plaintiff's procedures which constituted "common practice"); Taquino v. Teledyne
Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1500 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that there was no trade secret be-
cause no "showing that others in the industry did not have the same information . .. .") (post-
UTSA); Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 689-90 (holding that Surgidev's IOL manufacturing know-how
was not a protectable trade secret because it was "generally known" in industry; and "new product
ideas" are not trade secrets, when such products "have been on the market for years") (post-UTSA);
Greenberg, 378 F. Supp. at 812 (injection molding technique was "common knowledge in the plastics
trade at the time of the alleged misappropriation" and therefore not a trade secret) (emphasis added);
Cudahy Co. v. American Labs., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1344-45 (D. Neb. 1970) (clarifying that defend-
ant's plant and production techniques represented general principles and machinery common to the
industry, rather than trade secrets belonging to plaintiffs); Andrea Dumon, Inc. v. Pittway Corp.,
442 N.E.2d 574, 578-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that within commonly known range of temper-
ature settings, specific temperature setting was of no greater utility for manufacturing process, and
was thus not a trade secret).
50. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr § I cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 439 (1990); accord Acuson Corp. v.
Aloka Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (post-UTSA).
[Vol. 27:137
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public domain, either intentionally or inadvertently, simply cannot con-
stitute a trade secret."1 Conversely, even the most extreme efforts to pre-
serve confidentiality of information will not result in trade secret
protection if the information is not secret in the first place.52 Informa-
tion is not secret if it is "readily ascertainable" by proper means.5 3 Infor-
mation is publicly and "'readily ascertainable' if it is available in trade
journals, reference books... published materials, '54 patents,55 advertis-
ing, test marketing, or industry trade shows.5 6 Once again, the reported
decisions provide many examples of plaintiffs who have failed to meet
their burden of proving the existence of claimed trade secrets in the face
of evidence that such trade secrets were in fact readily ascertainable pub-
lic information.57
51. See Knudsen Corp. v. Ever-Fresh Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 241, 244 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
Colorado Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that price lists
published by plaintiff and distributed to customers, employees, and independent contractors were
not trade secrets) (post-UTSA).
52. Xpert Automation Sys. v. Vibromatic Co., 569 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (find-
ing customer list data ascertainable through both trade publications and contacts with customers
and competitors was not a trade secret) (post-UTSA).
53. Id.
54. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 688 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 828
F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
55. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 951 (10th
Cir. 1978); see Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Co., 634 F. Supp. 974, 984 (N.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd.,
790 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
56. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 439 (1990). See Sheets v. Yamaha
Motors Corp., 849 F.2d 179, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1988) (allowing alleged trade secret to be shown at
defendant's professional seminar, to be used as a demonstrator by a retailer and nine friends witbout
confidentiality restrictions, and to be photographed by defendant's representative, extinguished any
proprietary rights plaintiff may have had in alleged trade secret) (post-UTSA); National Presto In-
dus. v. Hamilton Beach, Inc., No. 88 C10567, 1990 WL 208594, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1990)
(holding that disclosures made in trade show displays and in test marketing the product were the
type of disclosures that resulted in the abandonment of a trade secret) (post-UTSA); Economation,
Inc. v. Automated Conveyor Sys. 694 F. Supp. 553, 556 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (holding that price quotes
provided to customers were "readily ascertainable" under UTSA); Century Personnel, Inc. v. Brum-
mett, 499 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that information obtained through news-
paper advertisements were not trade secrets) (post-UTSA). For an intriguing line of jurisprudence
on the issue of whether disposing of averred trade secret data by placing such data in the trash
constitutes public disclosure or lack of secrecy sufficient to preclude trade secret status and protec-
tion, see Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding trade
secrets not abandoned for lack of secrecy); B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Eheen, 414 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding trade secret survived inadvertant disclosure) (post-UTSA). But see Frank W.
Winne & Sons v. Palmer, No. 91-2239, 1991 WL 155819 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991). See also
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(2)(6)(3); UNiF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433,
439 (1990) (accident or mistake that can result in misappropriation involves conduct "that does not
constitute a failure of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain secrecy");
RESTATEMENT Op TORTS §§ 757(d), 758 (1939).
57. See, eg., Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson & Wayne Mfg., 537 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. 1975)
(holding that customer lists, plans, or designs consisting of information available anywhere, were not
trade secrets); Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc. 940 F.2d 1441, 1444-45 (11th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that sale of machines containing alleged trade secret "destroyed any reasonable expectation of
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The employer will not forfeit his trade secret claim by disclosing
information to employees or third parties who need the information to
carry on the employer's business.5" A plaintiff may divulge alleged trade
secrets to employees, suppliers, licensees, or other third-parties who need
the information in order to conduct business with the plaintiff.59 How-
ever, the requisite element of secrecy is not forfeited as long as the infor-
mation is revealed in confidence and under an implied, or presumably
express, obligation not to use or disclose the information in an unauthor-
ized manner.' If, on the other hand, the plaintiff discloses alleged trade
secrets to third parties without reserving rights in the claimed trade
secrets (perhaps through a confidentiality agreement), the plaintiff can
not claim trade secret status and protection for the information.61
The plaintiff will commonly be required to show that reasonably ex-
tensive measures were taken to ensure secrecy.62 A trade secret plaintiff
must demonstrate that in its offices and manufacturing facilities, it con-
sidered its technology to be confidential trade secrets, and treated its
secrecy by placing the machines in the public domain"); Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone
Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that where alleged trade secrets
were discoverable by examining plaintiff's patent and certain materials published or otherwise dis-
seminated by plaintiff, no trade secrets existed); Capitol Mktg. Assoc. v. Western States Life Ins.
Co., No. 884199-R, 1991 WL 50255, at *4 (D. Kan. March 14, 1991) (holding that no trade secret
existed where the information was available to anyone) (post-UTSA); Knudsen Corp. v. Ever-fresh
Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 241, 244 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (denying trade secret status because alleged
trade secret was available to the defendant through trade journals and trade practices); Colorado
Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding plaintiff's customer list
not trade secret because data could be obtained from telephone directory and customer contacts)
(post-UTSA); Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
("Anyone equipped with a public telephone directory could have collected the contact information
... which plaintiff seeks to protect.") (post-UTSA); accord Carbonic Fire Extinguishers, Inc. v.
Heath, 547 N.E.2d 675, 677-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (post-UTSA).
58. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1975).
59. See id. See generally Peter L. Michaelson, A Brief Look at the Legality of Competitive Re-
strictions Imposed on Trade Secret Licensees By Trade Secret Licensors, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 320
(1981).
60. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475; see also Taco Cabana Int'l v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113,
1124 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that mandatory filing of architectural plans with a municipality does
not make the plans public information or eviscerate trade secret rights); Rockwell Graphic Sys. v.
DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1991) (post-UTSA); Gronholz v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 869
F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir. 1989) (post-UTSA); Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fabcon, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 81, 87 (D.
Minn. 1983) ("post-contract use of trade secrets by a franchisee creates a tort claim .... "); Mineral
Deposits, Ltd. v. Zigan, 773 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (post-UTSA).
61. See Secure Serv. Technology v. Time & Space Processing, 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1360-61,
(E.D. Va. 1989) (post-UTSA); Eli Lilly & Co. v. EPA, 615 F. Supp. 811, 820 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (citing
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985)); Bush v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
544 So. 2d 873, 875 (Ala. 1989); American Antenna Corp. v. Amperex Elec. Corp., 546 N.E.2d 41,
44 (1. App. Ct. 1989).
62. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 743 (Okla. 1980).
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technology as suchprior to the alleged misappropriation.6" In this regard,
courts tend to scrutinize plaintiffs' efforts to prohibit industry or public
access to the claimed trade secrets. Plant security is of paramount im-
portance in the context of manufacturing-related trade secrets. As the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Metallurgical Industries v.
Fourtek, Inc.," a manufacturer's "subjective belief of a secret's existence
suggests that the secret exists. Security measures, after all, cost money; a
manufacturer therefore presumably would not incur these costs if it be-
lieved its competitors already knew about the information involved."6
Thus, it is no surprise that there exists a substantial correlation between
the existence (and degree) of plant security precautions taken to protect
putative trade secrets and judicial cognizance of the existence of such
trade secrets.66
Stringent internal office security and company-wide security policies
are also looked upon favorably by the courts in trade secret litigation.67
63. See Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 413 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding that security
measures taken after the alleged misappropriation are too late and therefore irrelevant).
Whether a plaintiff's invocation of the evidentiary "subsequent remedial measures" rule, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 2407 (1981), would preclude the admission of a defendant's evidence of a plaintiff's
recently implemented trade secret security measures to prove a relative lack of trade secret security
is an interesting issue. See generally Susan B. Ward, Note, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial
Measures, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 371 (1979). The ultimate determination of this issue rests in the trial
court's determination of whether: (1) plaintiff's conduct in failing to adequately protect its alleged
trade secrets is properly and directly at issue; (2) section 2407 is applicable; and (3) any of the
numerous exceptions to section 2407 are applicable. It would be a difficult task for a plaintiff to
overcome these delineated impediments to the applicability of section 2407 in a trade secret case.
Additionally, it would be difficult for the defendant to successfully introduce this type of evidence
because the defendant would have to demonstrate that the proffered evidence is probative under the
evidentiary standards espoused in the Oklahoma evidence code, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2401-2403.
Such evidence would almost always be irrelevant under trade secret common or statutory law.
64. 790 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
65. IM at 1199; see Lamb-Weston v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991)
(post-UTSA).
66. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1983),
aff'd, 770 F.2d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (maintaining secrecy by restricted plant access, employee warn-
ings, physical barriers, visitor control systems, and vendor secrecy agreements); Greenberg Co. v.
Croydon Plastics, 378 F. Supp. 806, 813-14 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (conducting secret process in comer of
plant, away from other operations, by a few key employees); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener, Corp.,
393 N.E. 2d 895, 898-99 (Mass. 1979); Bertotti v. C.E. Shepherd Co., 752 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (securing plant by the use of guards when management is not present).
67. See Technical, Inc. v. Allpax Prod., Inc., No. CIV.A. 90-872, 1990 WL 41924, at *11 (E.D.
La. March 28, 1990) (restricting computer access on a need-to-know basis, mandatory confidential-
ity agreements on starting employment, and keys required to operate certain computer software
programs) (post-UTSA); Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, 648 F. Supp. 661, 693-94 (D. Minn.
1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987) (securing secret documents in locked files and distributing
secret materials on a strictly 'need-to-know' basis) (post-UTSA); Johns-Manville, 586 F. Supp. at
1071 (maintaining security by mandatory key employee nondisclosure contracts and oversight pro-
grams for publications); USM, 393 N.E.2d at 898-99; Bertotti, 752 S.W.2d at 651 (maintaining secur-
ity by mandatory employment agreements, mandatory plant visitor confidentiality agreements, and
13
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In Kodekey Electronics., Inc. v. Mechanix,68 the Tenth Circuit held that
mandatory execution of a secrecy or nondisclosure agreement represents
the "primary and essential [security] precaution" that an alleged trade
secret owner must exercise.6 9 However, in light of the foregoing authori-
ties, it is obvious that inordinate reliance on the language of Kodekey
would be risky. Secrecy or nondisclosure agreements are clearly not a
panacea in and of themselves, but merely represent one component of a
comprehensive trade secret security policy. Plaintiffs who fail to demon-
strate vigilant maintenance of requisite security measures simply fail to
sustain their burden of proof as to the existence of a trade secret.70
The existence of covenants not to compete, as well as nondisclosure
covenants,71 is probative of the existence of trade secrets. 2 However, it
shredding of sensitive documents before discarding). See generally MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 28-50 (2d ed. 1989); Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting
Trade Secret Information: A Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAW. 887 (1988); Thomas I.
O'Brien, Establishing A Company Policy and Program for Intellectual Property Rights, 50 ALB. L.
REV. 539 (1986).
68. Kodekey Elecs., Inc. v. Mechanix Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 455 (10th Cir. 1973).
69. Id.
70. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 743 (Okla. 1980); Capitol Mktg. Assoc. v.
Western States Life Ins. Co., No. 88-4199-R, 1991 WL 50255, at *4 (D. Kan. March 14, 1991)
(post-UTSA); Smith v. Mid-State Nurses, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 789, 790 (Ga. 1991) (post-UTSA); Gillis
Assoc. Indus. v. Cari-All, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that the cus-
tomer list is not a trade secret in the absence of evidence of affirmative internal or external physical
security, or confidentiality agreements) (post-UTSA); Gordon Employment, Inc. v. Jewell, 356
N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no trade secret existed where there were unlocked
files, lack of a confidentiality policy, and a failure to discuss confidentiality with employees) (post-
UTSA); Lowndes Prod. v. Brower, 191 S.E.2d 761, 765 (S.C. 1972).
71. See generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV.
625 (1960); Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompe-
tition Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The "Afterthought" Agree-
ment, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1468 (1987); P. Jerome Richey & Margaret J. Bosik, Trade Secrets and
Restrictive Covenants, 4 LAB. LAW. 21 (1988); Julie A. Henderson, Comment, The Specifically De-
fined Trade Secret: An Approach to Protection, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 537 (1987); Ferdinand S.
Tinio, Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration for Employee's Covenant Not to Compete, Entered
Into After Inception of Employment, 51 A.L.R.3D 825 (1973).
For a discussion of whether an employee-at-will, terminated by his employer for refusing to
execute a covenant not to compete, could sue his employer under a public policy exception to the
terminable-at-will rule predicated upon a restraint of trade theory, see Vaske v. DuCharme, McMil-
len & Assoc., 757 F. Supp. 1158, 1163-65 (D. Colo. 1990) (declining, on comity grounds, to enlarge
Colorado's public policy exception to employment-at-will doctrine to encompass a wrongful dis-
charge action predicated upon a restraint of trade statute (similar to OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217
(Supp. 1991))). See also Simon v. Brand Serv. Center, No. CIV.A.88-4114, 1989 WL 48455 (E.D.
La. May 1, 1989); Apperson v. Ampad Corp., 641 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Polk v. Mutual
Serv. Life Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Contra Bloom v. General Elec. Supply
Co., 702 F. Supp. 1364 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted a public policy exception to the terminable-at-will
rule wherein a terminated employee may bring a wrongful discharge tort cause of action if the em-
ployee is discharged for refusing to violate established and well defined public policy or for acting
consistently with such public policy. See Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989); see also
White v. American Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1420-21 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that a discharge
14
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must be noted that matters of general or common knowledge cannot be
unilaterally converted into trade secrets by contractually labelling them
as such.7 3 Furthermore, a misappropriator's conduct while employed by
the plaintiff may be judicially interpreted as an acknowledgement or im-
plied agreement that the employer's claimed trade secret was and "is a
trade secret subject to security measures."'7 4 Of course, if a restrictive
covenant is valid and in effect at the time of the alleged transgression, the
contract will govern the relationship of the parties concerning trade
secrets and competition,75 and will serve to protect the plaintiff's propri-
etary interests.76 Even if no contract is in effect, the independent tort law
of trade secrets has always functioned to enhance existing contracts or
replace non-existing contractual protection of trade secrets.77
must be significantly motivated by employee's compliance with, or refusal to violate, public policy).
See generally Brian F. Berger, Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 153 (1981); Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARV. L. Rnv. 1931 (1983).
72. See Kodekey, 486 F.2d at 455 ("An employee's express agreement 'not to disclose any of the
processes and methods' of his employer is a positive acknowledgment of the fact that some of such
processes and methods are secret.") (quoting 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 53.3 (3d ed. 1968)); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener
Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Mass. 1979); Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc.,
397 S.E.2d 110, 114 (Va. 1990) (post-UTSA); see also Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 693; Continental
Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976); Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Manage-
ment Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (post-UTSA).
73. Andrea Dumon, Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 442 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Inl. App. Ct. 1985); see also
Gabriel Int'l v. M & D Indus., 719 F. Supp. 522, 523 (W.D. La. 1989) (post-UTSA). The lesson to
be learned from cases like Andrea Dumon and Gabriel is that form cannot control over substance.
See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM TRADE SECRETS § 2.03, at 2-47 (1990) ("It is not the characterization of
the parties which establishes the existence of a trade secret.").
74. Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 693 (reasoning that the employee implicitly agreed that a process
was a trade secret because the employee designed plans ensuring security); see Alexander & Alexan-
der Benefits Servs. v. Benefit Brokers & Consultants, 756 F. Supp. 1408, 1414 (D. Or. 1991) (signa-
ture on confidentiality forms indicated understanding of confidential nature of the information)
(post-UTSA); Telerate Sys. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (employee authored
manual with proprietary information warning on cover); see also USM, 393 N.E.2d at 901; Dionne,
397 S.E.2d 110, 114 (Va. 1990) (post-UTSA); Aries, 366 N.W.2d at 369 (post-UTSA).
75. See Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 780 P.2d 1168 (Okla. 1989); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Lindley, 609 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1980); Cohen Realty, Inc., v. Marinick, 62 OKLA. B.J. 3313 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1991). See also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 7 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 463 (1990) ("The en-
forceability of covenants not to disclose trade secrets and covenants not to compete that are intended
to protect trade secrets ... is governed by other law.").
76. See Michels v. Dyna-Kote Indus., 497 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Indiana's
Trade Secrets Act states that the Act displaces prior conflicting trade secrets law, not contract law).
77. E.g., Techincal, Inc., v. Allpax Prod., Inc., No. CIV.A. 90-872, 1990 WIL 41924, at 10 n.8
(E.D. La. March 28, 1990) (post-UTSA); Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 697 n.19; accord Loral Corp. v.
Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Clinipad Corp. v. Aplicare, Inc., No. 235252,
1991 WL 27899, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1991) (post-UTSA); Televation Telecommunica-
tion Sys. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); McCombs v. McClelland, 354 P.2d 311,
315-16 (Or. 1960); see also Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1224 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (explaining that the existence of a confidentiality agreement between the parties
does not impliedly waive or preclude a common law trade secret action).
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In conclusion, if a plaintiff can establish uniqueness and secrecy,
trade secret law is flexible enough to encompass and protect an array of
information.7
B. Element Number Two: Confidential Relationship
Once the plaintiff proves ownership of trade secrets, the plaintiff
must next show that the defendant(s) "acquired the trade secret[s]
through a confidential relationship. '79  While the plaintiff might find it
difficult to establish the first element of secrecy, he should encounter less
difficulty in establishing that the defendant acquired the trade secrets
through a confidential relationship. This element of proof presents a
question of fact for the jury to resolve.80
The defendant's misconduct in discovering, disclosing, or using the
alleged trade secret is the focal point of the confidential relationship in-
quiry. Restatement section 757 declares that "[o]ne who discloses or
uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the
other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclo-
sure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other
78. See Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1991) (heli-
cal blade and waterfeed system technology for the production of curlicue french fries) (post-UTSA);
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (design modifications), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 154 (1989); Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202-03 (5th Cir.
1986) (finding no distinction between positive and negative knowledge and concluding that "negative
know-how" may achieve trade secret status); accord Courtesy Temporary Serv., Inc. v. Camacho,
272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (post-UTSA); see also Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v.
Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 1978) (operating and pricing policies
and mathematical "heat transfer coefficient"); Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486
F.2d 449, 455 (10th Cir. 1973) (speedometer technology); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 930
(10th Cir.) (IBM-compatible computer technology), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Surgidev,
648 F. Supp. at 691-92 (identities of consultants) (post-UTSA); Saunders v. Florence Enameling Co.,
540 So. 2d 651, 654 (Ala. 1988) (pipe coating process); Courtesy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (customer
list) (post-UTSA); Brostron v. Warmann, 546 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (gross profits docu-
ments) (post-UTSA); Televation, 522 N.E.2d at 1365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (analog circuitry); Michels,
497 N.E.2d at 588-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (formulas, customer lists); Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video
Center, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (video center's customer list) (post-UTSA);
Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (pricing information and
marketing strategy) (post-UTSA); Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Management Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d
366, 368-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (computer software) (post-UTSA) Bertotti v. C.E. Shepard Co.,
752 S.W.2d 648, 652-53 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (production methods, machine modifications, and
temperature and pressure settings). See generally Michael J. McNeil, Comment, Trade Secret Pro-
tection for Mass Market Computer Software: Old Solutions for New Problems, 51 ALB. L. REV. 293
(1987); Susan M. Shields, Comment, Trade Secret-The Most Widely Used Method of Protecting
Proprietary Interests in Computer Software. Is it the Most Effective? 17 CAP. U. L. REV. 291 (1988).
79. Black, 584 F.2d at 951. The statutory counterpart of the common law confidential relation-
ship requirement is the requirement of trade secret acquisition through improper means. See
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(1), (2)(a); see also infra notes 11, and 145-160.
80. See, eg., Metallurgical, 790 F.2d at 1204.
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in disclosing the secret to him .... .""
The phrase "improper means" is defined in section 757(a) as discov-
ery of another's trade secrets through physical force, theft, fraud, elec-
tronic eavesdropping, or other espionage.8 2 These examples are not
exhaustive. "A complete catalogue of improper means is not possible.
In general they are means which fall below the generally accepted stan-
dards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct."8 3 Restatement
section 757 cross-references section 759 which is entitled "Procuring In-
formation By Improper Means."8 4 The latter provision expands the defi-
nition of "improper means" to include "inducing employees or others to
reveal the information in breach of duty, . . . [or] procuring one's own
employees or agents to become employees of the other for purposes of
espionage.'"s This interwoven definition of the phrase "improper
means" is expansive enough to encompass virtually all conceivable busi-
ness misconduct.
s6
The phrase "breach of confidence," as utilized in Restatement sec-
tion 757(b), defies precise definition. Although the definition is broad
enough to include breach of contract, the ultimate question is "whether
in the circumstances B knows or should know that the information is A's
trade secret and that its disclosure is made in confidence."87 Primary
examples of the confidential relationships contemplated by the Restate-
ment are the relationships between principal and agent, 8 partners, joint
81. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757 (1939) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at § 757 cmt. f (1939). See also William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct
Constitutes Misappropriation of a Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287 (1990).
83. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).
84. Id. Section 759 provides that: "One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business
interest, procures by improper means information about another's business is liable for the harm
caused by his possession, disclosure or use of the information." Id. "The rule stated in this Section
applies to information about one's business whether or not it constitutes a trade secret." Id. at cmt.
b. Restatement § 759 and the legal ramifications of the dichotomy between trade secret (Restate-
ment § 757) and non-trade secret and non-trade secret (Restatement § 759) commercial data were
touched upon by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Oklahoma's most recent reported trade secret
decision, ABC Coating Co. v. J. Harris & Sons, Ltd., 747 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1986).
85. RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 759 cmt. c (1939).
86. For an example of what a California trial court labelled the "worst case" the court had ever
seen, see Courtesy Temporary Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356-57 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (finding by the trial court that the defendant "represented the 'American way' by being a
'small person who saved his money and went into business on his own in an attempt to make a life
for himself and his wife by stealing, lying and cheating. ") (post-UTSA).
87. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. j (1939).
88. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 393, 395, 396 (1958).
1991]
17
Cipolla: A Practitioner's Guide to Oklahoma Trade Secrets Law, Past, Prese
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
adventurers, 89 employers and employees, 90 and of course, fiduciary rela-
tionships.91 The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently elaborated upon the
scope of the duty imposed by fiduciary relationships in In re Mailath.92
The court observed that the fiduciary is held to a much higher standard
of conduct than that which applies to those acting at arms length in the
normal marketplace. 93
A corporate plaintiff may choose to assert that former officers, direc-
tors, or other key employees indirectly misappropriated trade secrets
through solicitation and employment of its employees in a competing
corporation. If so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the former officer
or director acquired sensitive information in derogation of a fiduciary
relationship with their former employer. 94 The former officer's or direc-
tor's fiduciary relationship is terminable, but the fiduciary duty towards
the employer is not.95 The fiduciary duty may be breached either during
or after employment, whenever the employee uses information gained
during employment to damage an employer or former employer.96
A plaintiff may also assert that former employees directly misappro-
priated trade secrets. To prove direct misappropriation, the plaintiff
89. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. j (1939).
90. See, e.g., Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Gibbon, No. 91-1201 (CSF), 1991 WL 160939, at *7
(D.N.J. Aug. 15, 1991); Hyde Corp. v. Hufines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
898 (1958); Klitzke, Trade Secrets, supra note 15, at 567, 569.
91. See Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 114 A.2d 438, 442 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955); Klitzke, Trade Secrets, supra note 15, at 567, 569 (corporate officers and
directors). Under Oklahoma common law, "[a] 'confidential relationship' is generally synonymous
with a 'fiduciary relationship.'" In re Estate of Beal, 769 P.2d 150, 154 (Okla. 1989). Oklahoma
law treats "the terms alike semantically as well as justicially." Id. at 154-55. See also In re Mailath,
752 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1988).
92. 752 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1988).
93. Id. at 809-10 n.15 (quoting Cardozo, C.J., from Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928)).
94. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1074 (E.D. Mich.
1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Klitzke, Trade Secrets, supra note 15, at 567, 569-70.
95. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768, 775-76 (10th Cir. 1982) (appealed from W.D.
Okla.); Johns-Manville, 586 F. Supp. at 1074-75; Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking
Corp., 114 A.2d 438, 441-42 (N.J.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955); Opie Brush Co. v. Bland, 409
S.W.2d 752, 757-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
96. See Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 233 P.2d 977, 1000 (Colo. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 870 (1951); Klitzke, Trade Secrets, supra note 15 at 569. As the court in Julius Hyman
admonished:
[D]efendants acquired... [plaintiff's trade secrets] while they were plaintiff's employees,
and under a contractual obligation, as evidenced by their employment agreements, and in
addition thereto this knowledge of plaintiff's trade secrets was acquired by them in confi-
dence and while they were occupying a fiduciary relationship. They now seek to appropri-
ate these trade secrets to their own use and profit by a violation of their contractual
agreements and a betrayal of the confidence reposed in them by plaintiff. This they may
not do; such conduct is abhorrent to our conception of ordinary honesty.
Julius Hyman, at 1000.
[Vol. 27:137
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must demonstrate that the defendant gained personal knowledge of the
secret information via a confidential relationship.9 7 For example, in
Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co.,98 because the defendant was "present
during much of the experimentation," he was "familiar with the essential
elements of the process[es]," and knew "the reasons why other methods
would bring unsatisfactory results."99 Thus, the defendant's personal use
of the information to gain a competitive edge constituted direct
misappropriation.1°
A confidential relationship "exists whenever trust and confidence
are placed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another." 101 The
potentially broad scope of such a relationship dictates that the confiden-
tial relationship element of the common law trade secret cause of action
is generally easy to establish.
C. Element Number Three: Use of Trade Secrets
Finally, even if a plaintiff can show that a defendant acquired its
trade secrets through a confidential relationship, the common law dic-
tates that the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant used the infor-
mation without authorization.10 2 Use of a trade secret is a question of
fact for the jury.103
1. The Restatement
The Restatement section 757 preamble expressly requires trade se-
cret disclosure or use as a prerequisite to liability, regardless of the means
of acquisition.1" Thus, quite clearly, "[c]ommercial use is an element of
the tort as set forth in section 757 of the Restatement; while the nature of
the use may be relevant in determining the proper extent of damages,10 5
its existence must also be shown to establish wrong doing in the first
97. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
98. 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
99. Id.
100. Id. See also Bertotti v. C.E. Shepard Co., 752 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (point-
ing out that defendant was involved in most stages of the development of the trade secrets).
101. In re Estate of Beal, 769 P.2d 150, 154 (Okla. 1989) (citing Fipps v. Stidham, 50 P.2d 680
(Okla. 1935)).
102. Eg., Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 951
(10th Cir. 1978).
103. Id. at 952.
104. "One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to
the other ifi:] (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes
a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him ...." RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
105. See Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Dulon, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 437, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1961)
1991]
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place." 106
a. Definition of "Use"
The courts have been reluctant to define the term "use" in the trade
secret context. Courts that have attempted a definition have encountered
difficulty. For example, perhaps the most commonly-cited definition of
trade secret "use" was promulgated by the Fifth Circuit in University
Computing Co. v. Lykes- Youngstown Corp.,1°7 wherein the court held
that "any misappropriation, followed by an exercise of control and do-
minion .. must constitute a commercial use." 108 Some twelve years
later, however, in Metallurgical Industries v. Fourtek, "9 the Fifth Circuit
retreated from its former broad definition of "use." In Metallurgical, the
court distinguished Lykes-Youngstown as a case in which "the trade se-
cret itself was what was to be sold." 110 The Metallurgical court reasoned
that the Lykes-Youngstown court "explicitly contrasted a case like ours,
'where the trade secret is used to improve manufacturing, and subse-
quently manufactured items were sold at a profit.' " Accordingly, the
court in Metallurgical employed the everyday meaning of the term
"use," and held that if the trade secret is a manufacturing process, "use"
is shown when the products are actually manufactured and sold.112
Although the court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict based on a
lack of evidence that the defendant had benefitted 113 from any misappro-
priation,11 4 the court cryptically noted that if the defendant sought to
(holding that, "[a]s a matter of fact ... [plaintiff] could show no damage since [defendant], at the
time of the hearing herein, had just commenced the construction of its plant.").
106. Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1205 (5th Cir. 1986).
107. 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974).
108. Id. at 542.
109. 790 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
110. Metallurgical, 790 F.2d at 1205 (quoting University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown,
Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 540 (5th Cir. 1974)).
111. Id
112. Id. ("If Smith has not put the furnace into commercial operation to produce carbide power
it can then use, then no commercial use has occurred.").
113. The fact that lack of evidence of any benefit to the alleged misappropriator played a role in
the court's "use" analysis lends support to the definition of trade secret "use" espoused in 1 MELVIN
F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 7.03[2][a], at 7-60 to 7-61 (1990 rev.). Jager advocates that "the
concept of 'use' should be defined so that no one will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another." Id. Thus, reasons Jager, "[i]n the broadest sense, the 'use' of a trade secret starts with the
beginning of the activity which causes economic detriment to the trade secret owner. This economic
detriment could be either damage to the trade secret owner or unjust enrichment to the misap-
propriator." Id.
114. Metallurgical, 790 F.2d at 1205.
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20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss2/1
OKLAHOMA TRADE SECRETS LAW
profit from use or sale of the product in the future, a different fact situa-
tion would arise.115
Thus, common law trade secret courts have been less than adept at
fashioning a durable and adaptable definition of trade secret "use." Simi-
larly, courts have struggled in the determination of whether a misap-
propriator may "use" a trade secret without actually benefitting from the
use. 116
b. Proof of "Use"
Rather than attempting to define trade secret "use," most courts
engage in a factual analysis of the circumstantial evidence before them in
order to discern trade secret "use." '17 Often circumstantial evidence is
the only evidence that a trade secret plaintiff can produce, due to the
nature of the cause of action.11 As the court in Greenberg v. Croydon
Plastics Co. 19 keenly observed:
Plaintiffs in trade secret cases, who must prove by a fair preponderance
of the evidence disclosure to third parties and use of the trade secret by
the third parties, are confronted with an extraordinarily difficult task.
Misappropriation and misuse can rarely be proved by convincing di-
rect evidence. In most cases plaintiffs must construct a web of perhaps
ambiguous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may
draw inferences which convince him that it is more probable than not
that what plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place. Against this
often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence there frequently
must be balanced defendants and defendants' witnesses who directly
deny everything.1
20
c. Evidentiary "Use" Factors
The courts have almost universally found the presence or absence of
three key factors to be probative in their evaluation of circumstantial
evidence of trade secret "use." Not surprisingly, the first key factor is
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See, eg., Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 771 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1985); Black,
Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 1978);
Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
118. See, eg., Greenberg, 378 F. Supp. at 814.
119. Id.
120. Id.; accord Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 928 (10th Cir. 1975) ("[No one testified that
he 'saw' Telex misappropriating IBM's trade secrets, nor did any ... IBM employee admit that he
had taken IBM's trade secrets with him to Telex. But, in our view, the facts and circumstances,
when viewed in their totality, do permit the inference that there was such misappropriation.")
Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Gibbon, No. 91-1201 (CSF), WL 160939, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 1991).
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the relationship between the parties. 121  In this regard, "[fliduciary re-
sponsibility is a powerful tool... in the hands of the owner of a trade
secret if the misappropriator is an employee, a partner, a corporate officer
or director, or an authorized agent." 122 In Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech-
nology, Inc.,1 23 the court found that the longstanding employer-employee
relationship between the parties gave rise to a confidential relationship
that "impose[d] per se a duty upon the employee[s] not to use or disclose
[their] employer's trade secrets." 24 In light of this confidential relation-
ship, the Surgidev court liberally interpreted the "use" element of the
trade secret claim as requiring not necessarily actual use or disclosure,
but rather "proof that there is an intention on the part of the defendants
to use or disclose the putative trade secrets, or alternatively, that under
the circumstances of the case, there is a high degree ofprobability of inev-
itable disclosure [and subsequent use]." 1 25
Perhaps in deference to the trade secret plaintiff's arduous burden of
proof concerning trade secret disclosure or use, the Surgidev court recog-
nized that:
A competing corporation formed by former employees of the plaintiff
is naturally subject to some degree of probability that the newly-
formed corporation will utilize trade secrets gained in the plaintiff's
employ. Some courts have found that where a defendant commences
competitive activity which might jeopardize plaintiff's trade secrets,
and where such activity is in breach of a valid restrictive covenant, the
Court might presume that wrongful disclosure will take place. 126
121. See, eg., Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 695 (D. Minn. 1986),
aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987). Note that the district court's judgment in Surgidev was purport-
edly rendered upon the basis of the UTSA of both California and Minnesota. Id. at 679-80. How-
ever, the court relied almost exclusively on pre-UTSA common law authority in its opinion. Id.
passim.
122. Klitzke, Trade Secrets, supra note 15, at 569.
123. 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
124. Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 694-95 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 695 (emphasis added). See also Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret
Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1988). But see Oberg
Indus. v. Finney, 555 A.2d 1324, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ("[Defendant's] position in the company
and the knowledge he obtained while in that position do not demonstrate an inevitability of disclo-
sure... which would require the issuance of an injunction.").
The Surgidev court relied on the elements of a trade secret cause of action set forth in Jostens,
Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn. 1982). Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 694
n.16. Significantly, although the elements articulated in Jostens were almost identical to the ele-
ments enunciated by the Tenth Circuit in Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel
Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1978), neither case mentioned or required anything
less than actual use or disclosure of another's trade secrets. See Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701. The
"intent to use or disclose" standard thus seems to represent a unilaterally generous construction of
the court's opinion in Jostens.
126. Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 695 (citations omitted); accord Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain
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Ultimately, the Surgidev court held that it did not need to rely upon a
presumption of wrongful intent, because the defendants had affirmatively
demonstrated their intent to use some of plaintiff's customer informa-
tion. 127 The court thus relied on evidence of actual trade secret use on
the part of some defendants and planned trade secret use on the part of
other defendants to raise an "inference of intent to use."1 28
The relationship between a former employee-defendant and the de-
fendant's new employer, a competing corporation in most cases, is an
important aspect of trade secret "use" analysis. If the competing corpo-
ration knew or should have known that the information it received from
its employee, the defendant, was obtained or disclosed improperly, or in
breach of confidence, then the defendant's employer would be equally
liable for the "use" of the plaintiff's trade secrets. 129 Furthermore, even
if a plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to hold its former employee person-
ally liable for misappropriation of trade secrets, the employee's present
employer may be held liable for the "use" and commercialization of the
plaintiff's trade secrets.1 3 A trade secret plaintiff may wish to carefully
consider including a competing corporation formed by, or employing,
former employees in litigation against the employees for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets.
The second key factor in judicial appraisal of circumstantial evi-
dence of trade secret "use" involves the presence or absence of material
similarities in the products produced or manufacturing processes utilized
Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1991) ("As a practical matter, it would be difficult for a
person developing the same technology for two clients not to use knowledge gained from the first
project in producing the second.") (post-UTSA); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp.
838, 845 (D. Conn. 1976) ("It is enough if the second employer's work is sufficiently similar to that
of the first employer to make likely the risk of disclosure by the employee in the course of his
subsequent employment.") (citing Eastman Kodak v. Powers Film Prod., 179 N.Y.S. 325, 330 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1919)).
127. Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 695.
128. Id. ("[Defendant's] ... business plan as disclosed in its prospectus indicates that [its]...
sales force planned to contact [plaintiff's customers].").
129. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(c) (1939); Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(2)(b). See
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1991) (post-UTSA);
Commuter Print Sys. v. Lewis, 422 A.2d 148, 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Lowndes Prod. v. Brower,
191 S.E.2d 761, 769-70 (S.C. 1972) (explaining that a corporation that has benefitted from wrongful
conduct along with its creators should be held jointly and severally liable for losses which the plain-
tiff sustained); see also Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 929 (10th Cir. 1975).
130. See Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 771 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1985). As to
whether or not such competing corporation is an indispensible party to trade secret litigation against
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by the parties. A defendant's slight or cosmetic modifications or im-
provements to plaintiff's trade secret will not defeat a claim of misappro-
priation. 131 The court will compare factors such as production efficiency,
costs, and speed, and product quality before and after alleged trade secret
disclosure or use. 132 Substantial changes on the defendant's part, result-
ing in cogent similarities in the factors indicate that the trade secret has
been used.1 33 Comparison of manufacturing processes and products1 34
often plays a substantial, if not dispositive, role in judicial recognition or
rejection of alleged trade secret "use." 135
Unfortunately, a quid pro quo analysis of the parties' respective
products and manufacturing processes is not always available, feasible, or
probative. In lieu of, or in addition to, such a comparative analysis,
courts often explore circumstantial evidence of the third key factor in the
adjudication of trade secret "use," commonly known as head start or
"lead time" advantage. "The concept of 'use' of a trade secret by the
misappropriator does not necessarily depend upon the generation of a
dollar profit."136 Even if no products embodying or using the trade
secrets have been built or sold, "a trade secret is used if it has contributed
to the acceleration of the introduction of the product." 137 Thus, the es-
sence of the "lead time" concept is discerning whether defendant's use of
131. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. c (1989); see ag., Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Gibbon,
No. 91-1201 (CSF), 1991 WL 160939, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 1991).
132. Klitzke, Trade Secrets; supra note 15, at 566.
133. Klitzke, Trade Secrets, supra note 15, at 566.
134. While differentiation of products is not an essential prerequisite to the existence of a trade
secret or a trade secret process, it may be demonstrative of trade secret use. ABC Coating Co. v. J.
Harris & Sons, Ltd., 747 P.2d 266, 268 (Okla. 1986). See infra note 135.
135. See Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 948
(10th Cir. 1978) (finding functional equivalency and similarity in design between the products); Ko-
dekey Elec., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 453 (10th Cir. 1973) (finding defendant's prod-
uct similar in appearance, operation and design as the plaintiff's product); Continental Group, Inc.
v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844-45 (D. Conn. 1976) (considering the marked differences in the
machinery, materials, and manufacturing techniques employed by the parties); Greenberg v. Croy-
don Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (finding that defendant's flavoring method
was essentially identical to the method used by the plaintiff even though the flavoring agent itself and
the quantity used were slightly different); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F.
Supp. 55, 63 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that Defendants' product
differed in every material detail from the plaintiff's product where defendants did not utilize the
same variations or details as plaintiff and the products varied in dimension, temperature and speed);
Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Management Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding no
material differences between plaintiff's and defendants' products).
136. 1 JAGER, supra note 113, at 7-59 (citing University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974)); see Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 914 (10th Cir.) (recog-
nizing that, although Telex did not complete the project at issue, improper use of IBM's trade secret
allowed Telex to save $10 million in development costs allowing Telex to be unjustly enriched), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
137. 1 JAGER, supra note 113, at 7-58; see Telex, 510 F.2d at 929 ("IBM employees brought with
[VCol. 27:137
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the trade secret resulted in a competitive edge by allowing the defendant
to enter the market faster or less expensively than otherwise possible
without improper trade secret use.
A trade secret plaintiff can advance an array of fact scenarios which
tend to be circumstantially indicative of the lead time advantage gained
by a defendant. For example, a former employee's quick start-up and
successful entry into a relatively complex competitive business may con-
stitute circumstantial evidence of lead time wrongfully gained through
trade secret use.138 A trade secret plaintiff should, through the discovery
process, 139 avail itself of the opportunity to inquire into the quantitative
as well as qualitative depths of the defendant's research and development
efforts and expenditures to date. The plaintiff can create a strong infer-
ence of lead time attained through trade secret use by showing that the
defendant's establishment and successful entry into the competitive mar-
ket occurred without the benefit of substantial independent research or
experimentation." 4 This inference may be overcome by the defendant's
them [to Telex] IBM trade secrets which enabled Telex to market [its products] sooner than it would
have otherwise been able to .... It was this 'head start' or 'lead time' that placed Telex in a better
economic position because of its misappropriation [and use] of IBM trade secrets."); see also Engel-
hard Indus. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 353 (9th Cir. 1963) (affirming that accel-
eration of production due to utilization of trade secrets gives rise to a claim of misappropriation),
cert denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 413-14 (3rd Cir.
1961); Epstein v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 116, 124 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
138. See Black, 584 F.2d at 948-49, 952; Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Gibbon, No. 91-1201 (CSF),
1991 WL 160929, at *7 (D.NJ. Aug. 15, 1991) (finding that "the circumstances surrounding [de-
fendant's employer's] extraordinary rapid introduction of [a competitive product] into the market
raises an inference of misconduct" by the defendant).
139. See generally Pope et al., In Discovery: Protecting a Client's Secret Data, NAT'L L.J., July 8,
1991, at 16, col. 4; Note, Trade Secrets in Discovery: From First Amendment Disclosure to Fifth
Amendment Protection, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1330 (1991).
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act, which provides for the protection of trade secrets during the
discovery process, states in part, "[i]n an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means."
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 90. Note that the statutory language of Trade Secrets Act section
90 is mandatory, whereas the language of title 12, section 3226(C)(6) of the Oklahoma Statutes is
discretionary. The only UTSA jurisdiction which has ruled upon this procedural conflict held that
the jurisdiction's discretionary rule of civil procedure governing trade secret protective orders con-
trolled over the UTSA's mandatory secrecy provision. See Vibromatic Co. v. Xpert Automation
Sys., 540 N.E.2d 659, 661-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); see also Gabriel Int'l v. M & D Indus., 719 F.
Supp. 522 (W.D. La. 1989) (post-UTSA); Brostron v. Warmann, 546 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Iln. App. Ct.
1989) (discovery of trade secrets "is not automatically foreclosed" under the UTSA). But see Stork-
Werkspoor Diesel V.V. v. Koek, 534 So. 2d 983, 985 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (UTSA "never intended to
apply to discovery in civil actions.").
140. See Black, 584 F.2d'at 952 ("If nothing else, a jury could find that [defendant] did not have
to experiment with the broad range of disclosed coefficients to determine the proper starting point.");
Atochem, No. 91-1201 (CSF), 1991 WL 160939, at *8 (finding that only defendant's disclosure and
defendant's employer's use of plaintiff's trade secrets could explain defendant's employer's "'devel-
opment' of such a similar process, given its complete lack of research, experimentation and produc-
tion."); Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("There is no
1991]
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showing that it arrived at and developed its manufacturing process or a
product independently. 41 A defendant's failure to overcome this infer-
ence can be fatal.142 The plaintiff's demonstration of unusually expedi-
ent pre-production advertising or contracting1 43 by a defendant is also
highly suggestive of lead time generated through trade secret use. 144 Per-
haps the most persuasive evidence that a plaintiff could offer of a defend-
ant's trade secret use is empirical data and expert testimony contrasting
(and emphasizing) the chronological and financial differences between
the respective parties' market entries and product developments. 145
2. The UTSA
The common law placed a difficult burden on the plaintiff trying to
evidence that defendants did any independent research to come up with a method for flavoring
mouthguards .... The decision to use [the plaintiff's] method was made without any prior experi-
mentation .... Defendants had apparently predetermined to use the [plaintiff's] method.") (foot-
note omitted).
141. See, eg., Greenberg, 378 F. Supp. at 815.
142. See Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the defendant's inability to establish the existence of a lawful source of the piece part drawings it
possessed created a permissible jury inference of misappropriation) (Post-UTSA); Electro-Miniatures
Corp. v. Wendon Co., 771 F.2d 23, 27 (2nd Cir. 1985); Black, 584 F.2d at 952 (finding that where
the defendant did not present evidence of an independent source of the coefficient, a jury could view
with suspicion defendant's statement that he pulled the number "out of the air"); Atochem N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gibbon, No. 91-1201 (CSF), 1991 WL 160939, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 1991) (Noting that
there was "no evidence that [defendant's employer] made any effort at all to research or experiment
.." The court found this fact "incredible."); Salsbury Lab. v. Merieux Lab., 735 F. Supp. 1555,
1569 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (finding that the defendants failed to show they developed the product
through independent research); Greenberg, 378 F. Supp. at 815-16; Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Man-
agement Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the defendant's failure
to show how they developed or acquired the product allegedly embodying the plaintiff's trade secret;
and the fact that the information was unavailable from any source except the plaintiff, constitutes
strong circumstantial evidence of trade secret misappropriation and use).
143. SeeAtochem, No. 91-1201 (CSF), 1991 WL 160939, at *8. Mere commonality of customers
does not, however, necessarily support the conclusion that a defendant misappropriated or used
another's trade secrets. Greenberg, 378 F. Supp. at 813.
144. See Electro-Miniatures, 771 F.2d at 26 ("[Defendant] Wendon, which had been able to
produce only a few printed circuit slip ring assemblies of questionable quality prior to employing
[defendant] Eccles, issued a catalog depicting an entire line of printed circuit slip ring assemblies,
resembling those built by [plaintif] EMC ... soon after it hired Eccles away from EMC."); Black,
584 F.2d at 948 ("[Defendant]... first successful underbidding [of plaintiff] was confidently accom-
plished without building or testing a prototype of the proposed [product]").
145. See, eg., Telex v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 911, 932 (10th Cir.) ("IBM had itself expended
$30,000,000 to develop the Merlin, and.., it took six years to do so. Telex, on the other hand,
through the use of IBM trade secrets was able to develop its equivalent in some eighteen months."),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Bertotti v. C.E. Shepard, 752 S.W.2d 648, 652-53 (rex. Ct.
App. 1988) (reasoning that defendant, who within five months of his departure from plaintiff's em-
ploy, formed a new company and stood ready to manufacture competing products in breach of
defendant's non-competition covenant, was only able to do so because defendant had the advantage
of four years of trial and error encountered in plaintiff's research and development program).
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establish trade secret use. The UTSA, however, has seemingly lightened
that burden.
The plain language of Oklahoma's version of the UTSA supports
the proposition that the mere acquisition of another's trade secrets,
through improper means, without subsequent disclosure or use,146 will suf-
fice to impose liability upon the defendant for misappropriation of trade
secrets. 147 A brief survey of the terms of art used and defined in
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act serves to corroborate this proposition.
Under Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act, a plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages for misappropriation of the plaintiff's trade secrets. 148  The
Oklahoma Trade Secrets Act defines the term "misappropriation" in per-
tinent part as acquisition of a trade secret by a person who knows or
should have known that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or the unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret by a person
who used improper means to obtain it, or at the time of disclosure or use,
knew or should have known that knowledge of the trade secret was ob-
tained from a person who had used improper means to obtain it.' 49
Note that the definition of "misappropriation" in Oklahoma's Trade
Secrets Act is articulated in the disjunctive-the "acquisition" provi-
sion, 150 and the "disclosure or use" provision,1'1 are separated by a semi-
colon and the word "or." '52 Thus, if a plaintiff can show that the defend-
ant acquired its trade secrets through improper means, the plaintiff does
146. The Oklahoma Trade Secrets Act does not define the term "use." See Oklahoma's Trade
Secrets Act § 86. Presumably, the Oklahoma judiciary would rely upon relevant common law deci-
sions concerning trade secret "use" in attempting to define and/or discern such "use" under the
UTSA. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
147. See Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act §§ 86, 88.
148. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 88(A).
149. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(2) (emphasis added). The UTSA's definition of "mis-
appropriation" has been interpreted as creating four distinct potential classes of trade secret misap-
propriators: (1) intentional; (2) fiduciary; (3) third-parties with notice that the trade secret was
acquired through improper means; and (4) those who accidentally acquired the trade secret. See
Lydon, supra note 2, at 430-31.
150. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(2)(a).
151. Id. § 86(2)(b).
152. Id. § 86(2). Oklahoma's version of the UTSA also contains a bifurcated damages provision.
The statute provides that "a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation. Dam-
ages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss." Id. § 88(A). However,
the provision goes on to posit that "[i]n lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the dam-
ages caused by misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty
for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret." Id. (emphasis added). See
also Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 89 (attorney's fee provision provides fees for, inter alia, willful
and malicious misappropriation); UNIE. TRADE SECRETS AcT 14 U.L.A. 433, 434 Prefatory Note
(1990) ("For liability to exist under this Act, a ... trade secret must exist and either a person's
acquisition of the trade secret, disclosure of the trade secret to others, or use of the trade secret must
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not necessarily have to prove that the defendant thereafter actually dis-
closed or used the trade secrets. The defendant may be liable under either
provision.
This task may not be too onerous because Oklahoma's Trade Secrets
Act defines the term "improper means" to include "theft, bribery, mis-
representation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain
secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." 3 The phrase
"improper means" under the UTSA may include "otherwise lawful con-
duct which is improper under the circumstances."' 54 Research has re-
vealed few reported decisions expressly interpreting "improper means"
as utilized in the UTSA.15 5 However, the purpose of the UTSA is to
provide "unitary definitions of trade secret and trade secret misappropri-
ation, and a single statute of limitations156 for the various property,
quasi-contractual, and violation of fiduciary relationship theories of non-
contractual liability utilized at common law," through codification of
well-reasoned common law. t" 7 Certainly the definition of "improper
means" in Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act is broad enough to envelop the
same type of evidence that a plaintiff would produce in order to meet the
common law requirement of acquisition of another's trade secret through
a "confidential relationship."15 8
The theory of strict liability under the UTSA for "acquisition" of
be improper .... "). The draftsmen of the UTSA obviously recognized that, pragmatically, mere
acquisition of one's trade secret through improper means, in and of itself, diminishes the present or
potential market value of the trade secret because the value depends, in material part, upon its
secrecy. See Herbster v. Global Intermediary, No. 89-2198-V, 1991 WL 205659 (D. Kan. Sept. 11,
1991); See also RESTATEMENT oF TORTS § 757 cmt. c (1939).
153. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(1); see also Hilton, supra note 82.
154. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr § I cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 439 (1990).
155. But see Herbster v. Global Intermediary, Inc., No. 89-2198-V, 1991 WL 205659, at *3 (D.
Kan. Sept. 11, 1991) (noting that actual damages are not required under the UTSA, as evidenced by
the fact that "the mere acquisition of trade secrets and theirpotential value or use are protected" by
the UTSA) (emphasis added); EDO Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 715 F. Supp. 990, 995 (D. Kan.
1988), aff'd, 911 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1990); Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d
301, 306-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Vis.
1989).
156. See Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 91 ("An action for misappropriation must be brought
within three (3) years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have been discovered. For the purposes of this section, a continuing misappropriation
constitutes a single clalm."). For an interpretation of the phrase "continuing misappropriation"
under the UTSA, see B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Eheen, 414 N.W.2d 48, 50-51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). See
also Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 94.
157. American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (em-
phasis added) (quoting UNIt. TRADE SECRETS Acr 14 U.L.A. 433, 435 Prefatory Note (1990)).
158. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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trade secrets through "improper means," regardless of subsequent "dis-
closure or use," found judicial approval in the only case directly address-
ing the issue. 15 9 That case was Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander," in
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court framed the issue as: What remedy,
if any, is available under the UTSA if a trade secret is acquired by im-
proper means, but not subsequently used by the taker?1 6' The trial court
held, in obvious deference to trade secret common law, that although the
defendant acquired the trade secret through "improper means," liability
for trade secret misappropriation could not be imposed unless the de-
fendant actually disclosed or used the trade secret.1 62 After reviewing
the language of Wisconsin's version of the UTSA, 16 1 the supreme court,
reversing the trial court, held that improper acquisition alone constitutes
misappropriation of a trade secret because the statute requires a violation
of only one of the subsections. 64 The court concluded that such a statu-
tory violation would trigger the availability of injunctive 65 or compensa-
tory relief in order to redress the injured trade secret owner under
159. See Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Wis. 1989); see also Rehabilita-
tion Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433, 434 Prefatory Note (1990). But see Insurance Assoc. Corp. v. Han-
sen, 782 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Idaho 1989) (holding that the plaintiff may have trade secrets, but since no
evidence of defendant's use of same, plaintiff's claim fails).
160. 434 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1989).
161. Id. at 774.
162. Id. at 778.
163. Both the Oklahoma and Wisconsin versions of the UTSA contain substantially similar lan-
guage. See Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act §§ 85-94; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 1989).
164. Minuteman, 434 N.W.2d at 774, 778.
165. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act provides for injunctive relief where actual or threatened
misappropriation is shown. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 87(A). In exceptional circumstances,
such as when prohibitive injunction is inequitable, the court may order that the defendant pay a
reasonable royalty for future use of the trade secret. Id § 87(B); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
AcT § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 450 (1990) (providing for the duration of an injunction); Lamb-
Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1991) (post-UTSA); Minute-
man, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778-79 (post-UTSA); Klitzke, Uniform Act, supra note 2, at 302-03.
The UTSA's injunctive relief provision has been interpreted as incorporating, as opposed to
displacing or conflicting with, pre-existing prerequisites to, or requirements for, the issuance of an
injunction. See Bishop & Co. v. Cuomo, 799 P.2d 444, 446-47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); see also MAI
Basic Four, Inc. v. Generic Business Solutions, Inc., No. CIV.A.9908, 1990 WL 3665, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 16, 1990). For an interpretation of the term "threatened misappropriation" under the
UTSA, see Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 356-57 (N.D. Ill.
1989) and Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
("The proper inquiry is not whether defendant already has used or disclosed, but whether there is
sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat, of defendant doing so in the future."). See generally Ed-
mond Gabbay, Note, All the King's Horses--Irreparable Harm in Trade Secret Litigation, 52 FORD-
HAM L. REVIEW 804 (1984); Ruth E. Leistensnider, Comment, Trade Secret Misappropriation:
What Is the Proper Length of an Injunction After Public Disclosure? 51 ALB. L. REv. 271 (1987)
(pre- and post-UTSA).
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Wisconsin's Trade Secrets Act. 166
III. ANCILLARY CONSIDERATIONS
In preparation of its litigation strategy against a defendant in a trade
secret action, a plaintiff must consider several collateral issues. Impor-
tant collateral issues include potential defenses, the amount and nature of
damages, and the possibility of recovering attorneys' fees.
A. Defenses
Trade secret law does not protect against fair and honest discovery
of products or processes.1 67 The defendant may legally discover the
product by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by reverse
engineering.168 The UTSA is in substantial agreement with the common
law on this subject, and indicates that "proper means" to discover a trade
secret include: (1) discovery by independent invention; (2) discovery by
reverse engineering (subsequent to acquisition of the product by "fair and
honest means"); (3) discovery under a license from the owner of the
trade secret; (4) observation of the item in public use or on public dis-
play; and (5) obtaining the trade secret from published literature. 169 In
addition to the assertion of lack of secrecy, the most common defenses
raised against a misappropriation of trade secret claim are the "experi-
ence" defense and the reverse engineering defense.170
166. See Minuteman, 434 N.W.2d at 774; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.90(3), (4) (West 1989) (pro-
viding that a court may grant injunction, restraining order, damages, and punitive damages).
167. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
168. Reverse engineering is accomplished by starting with the known product and working back-
ward to discover the process which developed or manufactured it. See id.; infra notes 182-94 and
accompanying text.
169. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1990) (citing RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. (f) (1939)).
170. A trade secret plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the existence of the trade secret and the
impropriety of the defendant's conduct in misappropriating, disclosing, or using the secret. There-
fore, the defendant's arguments of lack of secrecy, experience, and reverse engineering, which are
denominated as defenses in this article, may not technically qualify as affirmative defenses under the
Oklahoma Pleading Code. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2001-2027 (Supp. 1990). Caution and prudence
dictate, however, that any potential affirmative defense should be pleaded by a defendant, lest same
be waived. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2008(B) (Supp. 1990); RST Serv. Mfg., Inc. v. Musselwhite,
628 P.2d 366, 368 (Okla. 1981). Because these theories are pragmatically and invariably relied upon
by trade secret defendants as if they were affirmative defenses, their status as de facto trade secret
defenses warrants further scrutiny. For a discussion of the topic of secrecy, see supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
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1. The Experience Defense
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of trade secret misappro-
priation against former employees, and perhaps their competing corpora-
tion, then the defendants will inevitably argue that in the establishment
and operation of their corporation, they merely used knowledge properly
acquired through years of experience in the industry. Although the ex-
tent of a defendant's prior experience in the industry is not dispositive, 171
trade secret courts give it prominent consideration. 72 The "experience"
defense is specifically designed to refute the plaintiff's evidence that the
putative trade secrets were not generally known or used in the trade. 73
While many trade secret courts have tacitly recognized the validity of
this defense, 74 few have explored its parameters. However, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court attempted to do so in Amoco Production Co. v.
Lindley. 1 75
In Amoco, the court reasoned that in dealing with a trade secret
defendant who has amassed appreciable skill, knowledge, and experience
in the industry, the key question is how the defendant obtained the
knowledge. 176 If the employee learns of the trade secret knowledge in a
171. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844-45 (D. Conn. 1976).
172. See Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55, 61 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
("Prior to setting up the [defendant] C & P line, [defendant] Polnau had many years of experience in
the... art .... ), aff'd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975); Knudsen Corp. v. Ever-Fresh Foods, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 241, 244 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (reasoning that defendant's operation of a business for 37
years obviated any need he might have to obtain plaintiff's trade secrets using improper means); see
also Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent Property
Interests, 40 STAN L. REv. 519 (1988); P. Guthrie, Annotation, Employee's Duty, In Absence of
Express Contract, Not to Disclose or Use in New Employment Special Skills or Techniques Acquired In
Earlier Employment, 30 A.L.R.3D 631 (1970).
173. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 688 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd,
828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
174. See Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 952
(10th Cir. 1978); Safeway Stores v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d 661, 665 (10th Cir. 1955) (citing Brenner v.
Stavinsky, 88 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1939)); Mirafi, Inc. v. Murphy, No. CIV.A.C-C-87-578M, 1989 WL
206491, at *18 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 23, 1989) ("[Defendants'] use of general background knowledge and
experience which he may have acquired during his employment with [the plaintiftf is clearly not
actionable under North Carolina law."), aff'd in part, rcv'd in part, 928 F.2d 410 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1170, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal.
1989) ("[S]ecrets acquired and developed as a result of long employment in the particular trade may
be carried over and put to use by the new employer." (quoting Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio De-
vices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960))), aff'd., 914 F.2d
1256 (9th Cir. 1990); Knudsen, 336 F. Supp. at 244; Cudahy Co. v. American Lab., Inc., 313 F.
Supp. 1339, 1345 (D. Neb. 1970); Capsonic Group v. Swick, 537 N.E.2d 1378, 1383 (111. App. Ct.
1989) (acknowledging that generalized knowledge and expertise is neither subject to restriction nor a
trade secret); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 900 (Minn. 1983)
("[Trade secret law] will not protect talent or expertise, only secret information.") (post-UTSA).
175. 609 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1980).
176. Id. at 744-45.
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confidential relationship in the course of employment, then a duty not to
disclose the information arises. 177 However, if the trade secret is borne of
the employee's own initiative, then there is no duty not to disclose be-
cause the employee's interest in the trade secret is equal to, or greater
than that of the employer, or, in any event, the trade secret knowledge is
an integral part of the employee's skill and experience.' 78  The Amoco
court concluded that ultimately courts must balance the "equities be-
tween the right of the company to use its employees and resources to its
utmost advantage against the right of the highly developed mind and
skill of the employee."' 179 Thus, the success or failure of the "experience"
defense in trade secret cases is contingent upon whether it is possible to
separate the alleged trade secret from the employee's independent knowl-
edge.'8" As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reflected in Black:
It is difficult in [trade secret cases] to draw distinctions "between the
skills acquired by an employee in his work and the trade secrets, if any,
of his employer .... [T]he former may be used by the employee in
subsequent employment while the latter may not. Against this back-
ground it seems clear that trade secret status should be accorded the
fruits of research carried out by the plaintiff, compiled by plaintiff in
the form of charts, graphs, tables and the like for its day-to-day use,
and carefully guarded by plaintiff as confidential information."
Notwithstanding the difficulty of distinguishing between normally ac-
quired skills and trade secret information, where there is circumstan-
tial evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer trade secret use,
the question is for a jury to decide.' 8'
2. Reverse Engineering
Trade secret defendants may choose to assert that the plaintiff's
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research
Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1975)); see also Cudahy, 313 F. Supp. at 1345 (finding
that if the employee's experience in his trade substantially contributes to the development of the
putative trade secret, then no trade secret protection attaches because the employee's independent
knowledge and experience is properly the subject matter of a covenant not to compete).
179. Amoco, 609 P.2d at 745 ("[Iow closely tied is the [alleged trade secret] to intrinsic knowl-
edge of the innovator[?] In other words, is it possible to sort [the claimed trade secret] from the
inner workings of a man's knowledge... ?"). See also Klitzke, Trade Secrets, supra note 15, at 568
("If there is doubt whether the disputed information is a protectible trade secret or merely general
skill and knowledge, the doubt is usually resolved in favor of the employee, because courts usually
feel that a person is entitled to follow his or her chosen occupation." (footnote omitted)).
180. Amoco, 609 P.2d at 745.
181. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc., 584 F.2d 946, 952 (10th
Cir. 1978) (quoting Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Pa.
1970), modified, 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971)).
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trade secrets were actually discovered through reverse engineering. "Re-
verse engineering is the process by which a finished product is broken
down into its component parts or otherwise analyzed to determine the
manner in which the product was created." '182 Actual reverse engineer-
ing or independent development are complete defenses to a trade secret
claim. 183
Fruitful assertion of the reverse engineering defense is possible,
although success is not probable, since courts generally respond to such
contentions with heightened scrutiny. 8 4 Courts are well aware of the
fact that it is "too easy to merely announce the simplicity of reverse engi-
neering without a solid basis," and accordingly the courts demand that
the defendant produce corroborative evidence to substantiate the de-
fense.18 Based on these standards, a defendant's ability to demonstrate
that a plaintiff's trade secrets were actually discerned through analysis of
the plaintiff's products is difficult and contingent upon the nature of the
plaintiff's products. Naturally, some alleged trade secrets are more ame-
nable to reverse engineering principles than others.
However, a seemingly unclear ramification of this defense is the ex-
tent to which an assertion of the mere availability of improper means to
obtain information diminishes or negates trade secret status and protec-
tion.186 Therefore, if trade secret defendants invoke the reverse engineer-
ing defense at all, they will most likely claim that the plaintiff's trade
secrets could have been properly and easily discovered by reverse engi-
neering. This hypothetical aspect of the reverse engineering defense is
designed to refute the plaintiff's evidence that the trade secret was in fact
secret. 8 7 The hypothetical reverse engineering defense has generally met
182. Technicon Data Sys. Corp. v. Curtis 1000, Inc., No. 7644, 1984 WL 8268, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 21, 1984) (citing Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974)).
183. 1 JAGER, supra note 113, § 5.04[3][a][i], at 5-29; see Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc.,
940 F.2d 1441, 1455 (1lth Cir. 1991); Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537 P.2d 330, 334 (Okla.
1975).
184. See Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 675 (Wash. 1987) (excluding reverse engi-
neering evidence and rejecting the defense) (post-UTSA).
185. See id.
186. 1 JAGER, supra note 113, § 5.0413][a][i], at 5-29; see ABC Coating Co. v. J. Harris & Son's,
Ltd., 747 P.2d 266, 269 (Okla. 1986).
187. Recall that one of the six factors enumerated in the Restatement concerning the determina-
tion of trade secret status is "the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b, at 6 (1939) (emphasis
added). The Restatement also declares on this point that "a substantial element of secrecy must
exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the informa-
tion." Id. (emphasis added). The Restatement's secrecy requirements are substantially incorporated
into Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act which mandates that in order to receive trade secret protection,
information must not be publicly known or "readily ascertainable by proper means" and must be
1991]
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with judicial antagonism because courts perceive the assertion of this de-
fense as a surreptitious attempt to deflect attention away from defend-
ants' misconduct.18
At first glance, cases in this area seem to be in a state of disarray.
However, one common denominator implicitly permeates pre-UTSA and
post-UTSA analyses of the reverse engineering defense. This common
denominator originated in Justice Holmes' opinion in E. L Du Pont De
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland 9 and was later incorporated into Re-
statement section 757. According to the Restatement, the difference be-
tween trade secrets and processes or devices which are not secret is that
knowledge of the latter is available to the copier without the use of im-
proper means to procure it; knowledge of the former is available only by
the use of such means. 190 The employment of improper means to pro-
cure the trade secret, not the mere copying or use, is the basis of liabil-
ity.191 In the absence of breach of contract, abuse of confidence, or the
use of improper means to acquire the information, trade secrets can be
copied as freely as products which are not secret.' 92 As the court in
Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro,193 held (with seemingly equal application
to both pre- and post-UTSA cases):
The possibility of discovery by "fair and honest methods" does not pre-
clude the finding of a trade secret. At best, such possibility is one fac-
tor to consider in determining the novelty of the alleged trade secret.
Further, the proper focus of inquiry is not whether an alleged trade
"the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86(4)(a), (b).
188. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 853 (1989); Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrications, Inc., 584 F.2d
946, 952 (10th Cir. 1978); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 929 (10th Cir.) (finding that the
defendants' conduct in procuring trade secret information was not justified, despite the fact that the
information could have been obtained by independent means given enough time and money), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); see also Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 743 (2nd Cir. 1965) (citing Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911
(6th Cir. 1919)); Technicon Data Sys. Corp. v. Curtis 1000, Inc., No. 7644, 1984 WL 8268, at *8
(Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1984) (post-UTSA); Televation Telecommunication Sys. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d
1359, 1365 (Ill. 1988); Weed Eater, Inc. v. Dowling, 562 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978);
Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778-79 (Wis. 1989). But see Acuson Corp. v.
Aloka Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 368, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that although UTSA comment
states that "lawful reverse engineering is predicated upon acquisition of a product by 'fair and honest
means,'" obtaining "a product by ethically questionable means will not create secrets where there
were none in the first place").
189. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
190. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a, at 3-4 (1939).
191. Id
192. Ido
193. 689 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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secret can be deduced by reverse engineering but rather, whether im-
proper means are required to access it.... Accordingly, the term "re-
verse engineering" is not a talisman that may immunize the theft of
trade secrets. The relevant inquiry remains whether the means used to
obtain the alleged trade secret, including reverse engineering, were
proper.1
94
It is thus clear that actual reverse engineering subsequent to acquisi-
tion of the relevant product by proper means is a complete defense to a
trade secret misappropriation cause of action. This defense may be diffi-
cult to prove based upon the nature of the product. However, the hypo-
thetical reverse engineering defense is generally disfavored by the courts.
B. Damages
1. Compensatory Damages
The common law regarding the proper measure of damages in a
trade secrets case is far from uniform.195 However, the common thread
in trade secret cases is that the plaintiff should be made whole and that
there should be no double recovery. 196 Courts have fashioned four ap-
proaches to the determination of the proper measure of compensatory
damages in trade secret cases, each of which could properly serve as the
subject of its own article. In the interests of brevity, each measure of
damages is succinctly discussed below.
The first and most commonly utilized measure of damages is best
described as equitable disgorgement of unjust enrichment. This ap-
proach envisions damages comprised of" 'not what the plaintiff lost, but
rather the benefits, profits, or advantage gained by [the] defendant in use
of the trade secret.' "197 In assessing the defendant's "benefits" gained
through trade secret misappropriation, courts utilize the "standard of
comparison" test.' 98 This test requires a "comparison of the costs in-
curred by the defendant using the stolen trade secret, and the costs that
194. Id. at 232-33 (emphasis added).
195. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 930 (10th Cir.), cerL dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Proper Measure and Elements of Damages for Misappropria-
tion of Trade Secret, 11 A.L.R.4TH 12 (1982).
196. Telex, 510 F.2d at 931.
197. Id. at 930 (quoting International Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d
Cir. 1957), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958)). Three of the four approaches to trade secret dam-
ages were thoroughly reviewed by the court in Telex. Although the Telex court held that the dam-
ages issue would be governed by Oklahoma law, the Telex court's damages determination was not
based on Oklahoma law. The court lamented that its attention was not drawn to any existing
Oklahoma authority on the subject; and thus, it was compelled to resort to the common law of trade




Cipolla: A Practitioner's Guide to Oklahoma Trade Secrets Law, Past, Prese
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:137
would have been incurred had he not used the trade secret. The differ-
ence between the two is the 'benefit' [or savings] accruing to the defend-
ant, and is the measure of plaintiff's damages." 19 9 A trade secret plaintiff
would seek such an equitable remedy when the defendant's gains sub-
stantially exceed the plaintiff's losses from trade secret misappropria-
tion.2"° A trade secret plaintiff may also wish to invoke this "savings"
measure of damages when the misappropriation is discovered before the
defendant reaps substantial profits but after the defendant has used the
trade secret to save research and development expenses and gain lead
time in its product development or market entry.20 1
The second approach to trade secret damages advocates that the
plaintiff's actual loss, rather than the defendant's benefit or gain from
misappropriation of trade secrets, constitutes the better measure of dam-
ages.20 2 Where, as a result of trade secret misappropriation, the plain-
tiff's actual economic loss2°3 substantially exceeds the defendant's
economic gain, the plaintiff should claim that its loss should be the
199. Id at 930.
200. Steven S. Young & Margaret J. Palladino, Monetary Damages in Trade Secret Cases,
TRIAL, Mar. 1989, at 45; see Salsbury Lab. v. Merieux Lab., 735 F. Supp. 1555, 1571 (M.D. Ga.
1989); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener, Corp., 467 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (Mass. 1984); Jet Spray
Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1356-57 (Mass. 1979).
201. See Telex, 510 F.2d at 932 (awarding IBM the $10 million Telex saved in researching and
developing a product that Telex never completed, since Telex unjustly enriched itself through use of
IBM's trade secrets).
202. Id. at 931 (quoting Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-0, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (4th Cir.
1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972)).
203. The viability of a theory of recovery premised upon loss of good will as a proximate result
of misappropriation of trade secrets is an interesting issue. Oklahoma has not addressed the good
will theory of damages in any trade secret case. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has defined
the phrase "good will" in a manner conducive to this theory of recovery. The court defined "good
will" as:
[Tihe custom or patronage of any established trade or business; the benefit or advantage of
having established a business and secured its patronage by the public. The 'good will'
value of any business is the value that results from the probability that old customers will
continue to trade with an established concern.
Freeling v. Wood, 361 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Okla. 1961) (citation omitted). Damages based upon subse-
quent loss of good will appear to be consistent with the foregoing rationale. Courts have long recog-
nized that employers have a protected interest in customer good will and customer contacts. See,
e.g., Micro Plus, Inc. v. Forte Data Sys., 484 So. 2d 1340, 1342 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); All
Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 484 (Mass. 1974); Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 274 A.2d 577,
581 (N.J. 1971). However, despite this recognition, courts have not awarded damages (as opposed to
injunctive relief), specifically based upon a business' loss of good will. See, eg., Klockner-Humboldt-
Deutz Aktiengesellschaft, Koln v. Hewitt-Robins Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 283, 286,
288 (D.S.C. 1978); Technicon Data Sys. Corp. v. Curtis 1000, Inc., No. 7644, 1984 WL 8268, at *10
(Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1984); Opie Brush Co. v. Bland, 409 S.W.2d 752, 754, 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
As of this date, the good will recovery theory appears to have been embraced academically,
rather than judicially. See Griffinger, supra note 10, at 84; Felix Prindl, Damagesfor Misappropria-
tion of Trade-Secret, 22 ToRTs INs. L.J. 447, 449 (1987); Young & Palladino, supra note 200, at 45-
46; 2 Bus. TORTs (MB) § 17.03 [3], at 17-51 (1989). Significantly, not one of the aforementioned
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proper measure of damages.2'
The third judicial approach to trade secret damages combines the
first two damage theories. Traditionally, common law held that a plain-
tiff could recover either the plaintiff's losses (a legal remedy), or the de-
fendant's gains (an equitable remedy), as damages for trade secret
misappropriation, but not both.2 °5 The third approach rejects the con-
ventional view and reasons that due to the unification of law and equity,
the proper measure of trade secret damages is no longer an "either or
proposition," but may be a combination of remedies when necessary to
fully compensate the plaintiff.' °6 The "plaintiff who has suffered a loss
apart from the defendant's gain may want to use [this] cumulative
approach.
207
In cases where the defendant has made no actual profits and the
commentators cited a single trade secret case which actually utilized, endorsed, or rejected the loss
of good will damages theory.
Only one seminal case recognizes the existence and validity of a good will damage theory in the
context of trade secret litigation. See Carter Prod. Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383
(D. Md. 1963). The case involved bifurcated proceedings in which the trial court found defendant
Colgate liable for patent infringement and misappropriation of the plaintiff's (Carter's) trade secrets.
Id. at 386-87. Carter contended "that the Master should have included in his recommended award,
either as part of [Colgate's] profits or as a separate item, the value of the good will which Colgate
built up... over the years by means of" Colgate's misappropriation of Carter's trade secrets. Id. at
389. The court ascertained that "the momentum of good will which Colgate had built up" for
Colgate's offending products "carried over in large measure to the altered products." Id. at 407.
Note that Carter claimed entitlement to the value of the good will gained by Colgate, and not the
value of the good will lost by Carter, as a result of Colgate's misconduct. In most cases, a plaintiff's
good will damages claim will be predicated upon the value of the good will lost by the plaintiff, and
not the value of the good will gained by the defendant as a result of the defendant's misconduct, or at
least a combination thereof. The court in Colgate appears to have recognized the good will theory
of damages in the trade secret context. The court declined to award good will damages delineated as
such, based upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case before it. Id. at 407. However, the
court's thoughtful consideration of the issue enhanced rather than disparaged the inherent legiti-
macy of a theory of recovery for loss of good will in trade secret cases. It seems that a theory of
recovery premised upon loss of a business' good will as a result of misappropriation of the business'
trade secrets is a viable if somewhat obscure concept in trade secret law. Although it appears that a
trade secret plaintiff may assert this theory, it should not expect to recover good will damages unless
the plaintiff can: (1) convince the court to accept this theory; and (2) produce substantial and con-
vincing proof of its actual loss of good will to support its claim. At least one district court has
denied, albeit in cursory if not conclusory fashion, a defendant's motion for summary judgment
which was premised on the speculative nature of the plaintiff's good will damage claim in a post-
UTSA trade secret case. See Herbster v. Global Intermediary, Inc., No. 89-2198-V, 1991 WL
205659, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 1991).
204. See Young & Palladino, supra note 200; see also Salsbury Lab. v. Merieux Lab., 735 F.
Supp. 1555, 1571 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
205. See Young & Palladino supra note 200, at 45.
206. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 931 (10th Cir.) (citing Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006,
1011 (9th Cir. 1972)), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
207. Young & Palladino, supra note 200, at 46; see Telex, 510 F.2d at 931-32 (utilizing this
comprehensive approach to award IBM damages for its lost rentals as well as Telex's profits from
Telex's misappropriation of IBM's trade secrets to prevent unjust enrichment).
37
Cipolla: A Practitioner's Guide to Oklahoma Trade Secrets Law, Past, Prese
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
plaintiff is unable to prove a specific pecuniary loss, courts must look to a
fourth measure of trade secret damages-the "reasonable royalty" ap-
proach.208 In the trade secret context, a "reasonable royalty" is not tan-
tamount to "a simple percentage of actual profits"; instead, the trier of
fact must determine "the actual value of what has been appropriated ' 2 9
and award this amount to the plaintiff. This "reasonable royalty" may
be based upon an established royalty, if one exists, or upon the hypotheti-
cal royalty that would result from arms length negotiations between a
willing licensor and a willing licensee.210
To ascertain a reasonable royalty when no actual royalty or industry
standard exists, the trier of fact must determine what the parties would
have agreed to as a fair price for licensing the defendant to use the trade
secret as the defendant intended at the time of the misappropriation. 21 1
The trier of fact should consider factors such as the resulting and foresee-
able changes in the parties' competitive posture; the prices paid by prior
purchasers or licensees; the total value of the secret to the plaintiff, in-
cluding development cost and the secret's importance to the plaintiff's
business; the intended nature and extent of trade secret use by the de-
fendant; and other unique factors presented by the case that might have
affected the parties' agreement, such as the availability of an alternative
process.212 In short, the trier of fact must construct a methodology for a
subjective, yet hypothetical, negotiation between the parties that removes
the animosity between the parties and "comports with industry
practice. '2 13
The Oklahoma Trade Secrets Act has expressly incorporated all
four of the foregoing common law measures of trade secret damages into
its damages provision.21 4 Thus, cases involving common law trade secret
208. See Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1357 n.10 (Mass. 1979).
209. Metallurgical Indus., v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1208 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Univer-
sity Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 537 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting from
Vitro Corp. v. Hall Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 1961))).
210. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus., 718 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (cit-
ing Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also UNIP.
TRADE SECRETS Acr § 3 cmt., 14 U.LA. 433, 456 (1990) ("In order to justify this alternative
measure of damages, there must be competent evidence of the amount of a reasonable royalty.").
211. Metallurgical, 790 F.2d at 1208.
212. Id.
213. Johns-Mansville, 718 F. Supp. at 1313, 1315.
214. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act provides that:
Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring
knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequita-
ble, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation. Damages can in-
clude both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by
[Vol. 27:137
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damages will most likely guide Oklahoma courts in determining the
proper measure of damages under the Trade Secrets Act.21
It is often difficult to make an educated guess or projection concern-
ing a trade secret plaintiff's ultimate recoverable compensatory damages
because of the multiple approaches the courts use and the fact-driven
inquiry they entail. However, regardless of which theory of damages a
trade secret plaintiff elects to pursue, the courts have consistently held
that "[t]he fact that such damages may be difficult to pin down should
not militate in favor of the wrongdoer.
2 16
2. Punitive Damages
Once compensatory damages are sought and awarded in a trade
secrets case, the court has the discretion, on a proper record, to award
punitive damages.217 "[A] breach of faith underlies every trade secret
claim. However, establishing that breach alone is insufficient to warrant
an award of punitive damages; one must also demonstrate that the de-
fendant acted wantonly, willfully, or in reckless disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights." 2 18
misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of dam-
ages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unau-
thorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 88(A). Unauthorized disclosure or use, as opposed to mere misap-
propriation, must be established as a prerequisite to the use of the reasonable royalty measure of
damages under the UTSA. See id. The UTSA's damages provision "adopts the principle of the
recent cases allowing recovery of both a complainant's actual losses and a misappropriator's unjust
benefit that are caused by misappropriation." UNnF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433,
456 (1990); see Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Management Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (awarding compensatory damages comprised of: (1) plaintiff's actual loss; (2) defendants' un-
just enrichment; and (3) a 33% industry standard reasonable royalty, under Minnesota's UTSA
damages provision).
215. See Mineral Deposits Ltd. v. Zigan, 773 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Jet
Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. 1979), in its consideration of the proper
measure of post-UTSA compensatory damages for trade secret misappropriation, and adopting the
cumulative or comprehensive measure of such damages).
216. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). In
this regard, it must be recalled that "the rule which proscribes the recovery of uncertain and specula-
tive damages applies where the fact of damage is uncertain, not where the amount of damages is
uncertain. Where the fact is certain, the uncertainty as to the amount will not prevent damages from
being assessed." 1 JAGER, supra note 113, § 7.03[2][a] (citing Matarese v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631, 637 (2d Cir. 1946); Reliable Tire Distrib., Inc. v. Kelly Springfield Tire
Co., 607 F. Supp. 361, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
217. See, eg., Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1972).
218. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re
Innovative Constr. Sys., 793 F.2d 875, 889 (7th Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 154 (1989); see
USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 467 N.E.2d 1271, 1285 (Mass. 1984).
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Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act should not materially alter tradi-
tional judicial ability to award punitive damages in trade secret cases.
However, it does, to a degree, statutorily restrict the scope of such dam-
ages. The Oklahoma Trade Secrets Act provides that "[iff willful and
malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary dam-
ages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made pursuant" to the
compensatory damage provision of the Trade Secrets Act .219 This puni-
tive damage standard differs somewhat from Oklahoma's general statu-
tory punitive damage standard,220 as well as the common law's trade
secret punitive damage standard.221 However, Oklahoma's Trade Secrets
Act should not impede the plaintiff's ability to recover statutorily limited
punitive damages upon a proper demonstration of the requisite state of
mind of the defendant, as other UTSA jurisdictions have already held.22 2
C. Attorneys' Fees
An award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing trade secret plaintiff is
governed, of course, by state law.223 Prior to the promulgation of the
UTSA, the majority of states, including Oklahoma, followed the Ameri-
can rule, which makes each party responsible for its own attorneys' fees
in the absence of a contrary statute or contract.224 With the advent of
the UTSA, however, attorneys' fees in trade secret cases became a matter
of statutory law. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act allows the court to
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if a misappropri-
ation claim is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an injunction is
219. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 88(B) (emphasis added); see afso UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
Acr § 3 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 457 (1990) ('This provision follows federal patent law in leaving
discretionary trebling to the judge even though there may be a jury, compare 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1976)."); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 680 (Wash. 1987) (finding punitive damages
under the UTSA discretionary with the trial court).
The Oklahoma Trade Secrets Act does not define the terms "willful" or "malicious." See
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86. Presumably, the Oklahoma judiciary would rely upon
Oklahoma's generic punitive damages provision, OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (Supp. 1990), and judicial
interpretations thereof, as well as relevant decisions of other UTSA jurisdictions in adjudicating the
issue of punitive damages under the Trade Secrets Act. For cases interpreting the UTSA punitive
damages provision, see infra note 222.
220. See ORLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 ("wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of another, op-
pression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed").
221. See Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1248 (explaining that trial judge and jury are given wide
descretion to assess punitive damages).
222. See Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Management Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Boeing, 738 P.2d at 680-81; McCormack and Dodge Corp. v. ABC Management Sys., 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 432, (Wash. Dec. 22, 1983). See infra note 226.
223. See Cherne Indus. v. Grounds & Assoc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 96-97 (Minn. 1979).
224. 1 JAGER, supra note 113, § 7.04; see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 261-63, (1975); Kay v. Venezuelan Sun Oil Co., 806 P.2d 648, 650 (Okla. 1991).
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made or defended in bad faith, or if the misappropriation is wilful and
malicious.225
Under the UTSA, a plaintiff's ability to recover attorneys' fees is
closely tied to the plaintiff's ability to recover punitive damages.226
Thus, to the extent a plaintiff may recover punitive damages under
Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act, the plaintiff may also recover attorneys'
fees.227 Other UTSA states have not been reluctant to award attorneys'
fees (and punitive damages) to plaintiffs, or for that matter, defendant's
who have made satisfactory evidentiary showings.228
IV. CONCLUSION
The common law trade secret cause of action consists of three ele-
ments. The statutory action may consist of only two elements. First,
under both schemes, a trade secret plaintiff must prove that the informa-
tion it seeks to protect merits trade secret status and protection because it
fits the legal definition of a trade secret. Secrecy is an essential element of
trade secret claims. However, one cannot convert something that is not
otherwise a trade secret into a trade secret by merely by keeping it secret,
or by contractually designating it as a trade secret. One must first show
the existence of a trade secret before the secrecy issue becomes impor-
tant. Factual issues will exist concerning the extent of a plaintiff's affirm-
ative efforts to maintain secrecy, the number and legal status of people to
225. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4, 14 U.L.A. 433, 460 (1990). "[Ihe court should take
into consideration the extent to which a complainant will recover exemplary damages in determining
whether additional attorney's fees should be awarded." UNIw. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4 cmt., 14
U.L.A. 433, 460 (1990).
226. Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 89. The Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act does not define the
phrase "bad faith." See Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 86. Presumably, the Oklahoma judiciary
would rely upon Oklahoma statutes which deal with the concept of bad faith and judicial interpreta-
tions thereof, as well as relevant decisions of other UTSA jurisdictions, to adjudicate the issue of
"bad faith" attorneys' fees under the UTSA. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (Supp. 1990); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 13, § 103 (Supp. 1990). See infra note 228; see also supra note 219 UTSA definitions of
"wilful" and "malicious").
227. Compare Oklahoma's Trade Secrets Act § 89(3) with § 88(B).
228. See Clinipad Corp. v. Applicare, Inc., No. 235252, 1991 WL 88156 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
21, 1991); Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Aries Info. Sys. v.
Pacific Management Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Boeing Co. v. Serracin
Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 680-81 (Wash. 1987); McCormack & Dodge Corp. v. ABC Management Sys.,
222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 432,446 (Wash. Dec. 22, 1983). Compare Andrew Corp. v. Van Doren Indus.,
No. Civ. A. 88-2414-0, 1990 WL 136779, at *5 (D. Kan. July 5, 1990); Qad. Inc. v. ALN Assoc.,
Inc., No. 88-C-2246, 1990 WL 93362, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 1990) (declining to award UTSA
attorneys' fees upon application of subjective standard of bad faith under UTSA, and awarding
attorneys' fees based upon plaintiff's failure of objective good faith component of FED. R. Civ. P.
11). But see Colorado Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303, 1307-08 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (revers-
ing trial court's award of attorneys' fees partially because no Colorado UTSA jurisprudence existed
when case filed).
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whom trade secret information was disclosed, and the extent of unau-
thorized use or disclosure.
Assuming that the plaintiff can satisfy the concomitant requirements
of the existence of a trade secret and secrecy, then, at common law, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant acquired the trade secret through,
i.e., in breach of, a confidential relationship. This element is easily estab-
lished in most cases. The employer-employee relationship alone estab-
lishes the required confidential relationship. The statutory corollary of
common law confidential relationship is acquisition of the trade secret
through improper means. Almost any commercial misconduct can fall
within the purview of "improper means."
Finally, the plaintiff must show that the defendant used and/or im-
properly acquired the trade secret. There is an apparent divergence be-
tween the Restatement position on the issue, reaffirming the common
law, and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as adopted in Oklahoma. The
Restatement position requires both acquisition and use. The Oklahoma
Trade Secrets Act requires either improper acquisition or use. Thus,
under the Oklahoma Trade Secrets Act, it is possible to establish a trade
secret claim if someone improperly acquires a trade secret and never uses
or discloses it or if someone improperly uses or discloses a trade secret
after properly acquiring it. Currently, there are no Oklahoma cases
which address the conflict between the UTSA and the common law.
In addition to the assertion of lack of secrecy, there are two possible
defenses that come to mind immediately when considering any trade se-
cret case. Under Oklahoma's pleading scheme, a defendant may have to
raise them specifically as affirmative defenses. The first is the experience
defense which is an averment by the defendant that the product at issue
was discovered through the defendant's own industry experience. The
defense is a question of fact and is designed to defeat a plaintiff's attempt
to prove that the trade secret was not generally known or used in the
trade. Secondly, the defendant may argue that the alleged trade secret
was properly discovered by reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is a
process by which a finished product is broken down into its component
parts or otherwise analyzed to determine the manner in which it was
created. Actual reverse engineering is a complete defense to a trade se-
cret claim. Reverse engineering can be a difficult element to prove de-
pending upon the item to be analyzed, and whether such an item lends
itself to reverse engineering principles.
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Damages for misappropriation of a trade secret can be both com-
pensatory and punitive. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, punitive
damages are limited to twice the amount of compensatory damages.
There are four approaches to determine the proper measure of compen-
satory damages; (1) equitable disgorgement of unjust enrichment; (2)
plaintiff's actual loss; (3) a combination of the first two approaches; and
(4) "reasonable royalty" approach which is used in default of the three
other measures. The difficulty of establishing damages will not be a bar
to a plaintiff's recovery. It is often difficult to project a trade secret
plaintiff's ultimate compensatory damages because of the multiple ap-
proaches the courts use and the fact-dependent inquiry of those ap-
proaches. Attorneys' fees awarded under the UTSA will be tied to
whether punitive damages can be recovered.
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